This article, originally published in 1966 as part of a *Festschrift* for Wolfgang Cramer, is a pioneering essay by Dieter Henrich that revisits the work of J.G. Fichte, focusing on his concept of "original insight" (ursprüngliche Einsicht). Henrich's essay, which has been republished and discussed extensively, argues that Fichte's philosophy, particularly his theory of self-consciousness (Selbstbewusstsein), represents a significant contribution to modern philosophy. Henrich emphasizes the systematic importance of self-consciousness as a central issue in modern philosophy and highlights Fichte's role in identifying the unique philosophical problem posed by self-consciousness. Henrich's analysis is structured around three stages of Fichte's evolving theory of self-consciousness: 1. **Absolute Self-Possession (püne simple Ich-posing)**: Fichte posits that the self arises through a pure and simple act of self-posing, emphasizing the active and immediate nature of self-consciousness. 2. **Self-Possession as Self-Posing (püne simple Ich-posing as self-posing)**: This stage introduces the idea that self-consciousness involves a perception of one's own self-posing, recognizing the cooriginarity of knowledge and existence. 3. **Self-Consciousness as an Activity with an Eye (eine Activity mit einem Auge)**: Here, Henrich suggests that self-consciousness is an activity in which an "eye" is inserted, symbolizing the deep fusion of cognition and activity. Henrich's essay also discusses the broader context of Fichte's philosophy, placing it within the trajectory of modern philosophy from Descartes to Kant and beyond. He critiques traditional reflective theories of self-consciousness, arguing that they fail to explain the emergence of self-consciousness. Instead, Henrich advocates for a more comprehensive and adequate description of self-consciousness, one that captures its fundamental nature as both a cognitive and an intuitive phenomenon. The article concludes with a systematic reconstruction of Fichte's three-stage theory of self-consciousness and reflects on the overall consistency and development of Fichte's philosophical system. Henrich's work has had a lasting impact on subsequent research, particularly in the areas of non-conceptual, pre-discursive, and existential certainty of self-consciousness. However, the article's specific interpretations of Fichte's text have been questioned in later scholarship, which has provided more nuanced and detailed analyses of Fichte's works.This article, originally published in 1966 as part of a *Festschrift* for Wolfgang Cramer, is a pioneering essay by Dieter Henrich that revisits the work of J.G. Fichte, focusing on his concept of "original insight" (ursprüngliche Einsicht). Henrich's essay, which has been republished and discussed extensively, argues that Fichte's philosophy, particularly his theory of self-consciousness (Selbstbewusstsein), represents a significant contribution to modern philosophy. Henrich emphasizes the systematic importance of self-consciousness as a central issue in modern philosophy and highlights Fichte's role in identifying the unique philosophical problem posed by self-consciousness. Henrich's analysis is structured around three stages of Fichte's evolving theory of self-consciousness: 1. **Absolute Self-Possession (püne simple Ich-posing)**: Fichte posits that the self arises through a pure and simple act of self-posing, emphasizing the active and immediate nature of self-consciousness. 2. **Self-Possession as Self-Posing (püne simple Ich-posing as self-posing)**: This stage introduces the idea that self-consciousness involves a perception of one's own self-posing, recognizing the cooriginarity of knowledge and existence. 3. **Self-Consciousness as an Activity with an Eye (eine Activity mit einem Auge)**: Here, Henrich suggests that self-consciousness is an activity in which an "eye" is inserted, symbolizing the deep fusion of cognition and activity. Henrich's essay also discusses the broader context of Fichte's philosophy, placing it within the trajectory of modern philosophy from Descartes to Kant and beyond. He critiques traditional reflective theories of self-consciousness, arguing that they fail to explain the emergence of self-consciousness. Instead, Henrich advocates for a more comprehensive and adequate description of self-consciousness, one that captures its fundamental nature as both a cognitive and an intuitive phenomenon. The article concludes with a systematic reconstruction of Fichte's three-stage theory of self-consciousness and reflects on the overall consistency and development of Fichte's philosophical system. Henrich's work has had a lasting impact on subsequent research, particularly in the areas of non-conceptual, pre-discursive, and existential certainty of self-consciousness. However, the article's specific interpretations of Fichte's text have been questioned in later scholarship, which has provided more nuanced and detailed analyses of Fichte's works.