The article by Ben Vilhauer explores Kant's theory of free will and moral responsibility, focusing on the incompatibility between determinism and moral responsibility. Kant argues that while determinism is true, we still have moral responsibility, based on a 'fact of pure reason' and the Second Analogy, which posits that all alterations are necessitated by causal laws. However, this raises a problem: how can an agent be the first cause of their actions if they are also the first cause of all events in the deterministic causal sequence? Vilhauer discusses Allen Wood's interpretation, which suggests that agents' choices affect the world by selecting a subset of possible worlds, but this does not fully address the scope of moral responsibility. Vilhauer proposes a solution involving "limited-instantiation-scope (LIS) laws," which would allow agents to be responsible for their own actions without being responsible for all events. This approach maintains our everyday conception of moral responsibility and is compatible with determinism. The article also critiques Henry Allison's "two-aspect" interpretation, which denies the ontological priority of noumena, and argues for a more nuanced understanding of transcendental idealism that retains the ontological priority of noumena.The article by Ben Vilhauer explores Kant's theory of free will and moral responsibility, focusing on the incompatibility between determinism and moral responsibility. Kant argues that while determinism is true, we still have moral responsibility, based on a 'fact of pure reason' and the Second Analogy, which posits that all alterations are necessitated by causal laws. However, this raises a problem: how can an agent be the first cause of their actions if they are also the first cause of all events in the deterministic causal sequence? Vilhauer discusses Allen Wood's interpretation, which suggests that agents' choices affect the world by selecting a subset of possible worlds, but this does not fully address the scope of moral responsibility. Vilhauer proposes a solution involving "limited-instantiation-scope (LIS) laws," which would allow agents to be responsible for their own actions without being responsible for all events. This approach maintains our everyday conception of moral responsibility and is compatible with determinism. The article also critiques Henry Allison's "two-aspect" interpretation, which denies the ontological priority of noumena, and argues for a more nuanced understanding of transcendental idealism that retains the ontological priority of noumena.