This paper explores the historical context and economic implications of the extension of the franchise in Western societies during the 19th century. The authors argue that the extension of the franchise was a strategic decision by political elites to prevent social unrest and revolution, rather than a result of existing political institutions. They propose that democratization changes future political equilibria by altering the median voter, thereby committing to future redistribution and preventing social unrest. The paper also links democratization to the Kuznets curve, where the fall in inequality follows redistribution due to democratization. The authors characterize the conditions under which an economy experiences the development path associated with the Kuznets curve, as opposed to two non-democratic paths: an "autocratic disaster" with high inequality and low output, and an "East Asian Miracle" with low inequality and high output. The analysis is supported by historical evidence from Britain, France, Germany, and Sweden, where the peak of the Kuznets curve coincides with the extension of the franchise. The paper contributes to the literature on political economy and growth, providing a novel explanation for the Kuznets curve and the different development paths observed in different societies.This paper explores the historical context and economic implications of the extension of the franchise in Western societies during the 19th century. The authors argue that the extension of the franchise was a strategic decision by political elites to prevent social unrest and revolution, rather than a result of existing political institutions. They propose that democratization changes future political equilibria by altering the median voter, thereby committing to future redistribution and preventing social unrest. The paper also links democratization to the Kuznets curve, where the fall in inequality follows redistribution due to democratization. The authors characterize the conditions under which an economy experiences the development path associated with the Kuznets curve, as opposed to two non-democratic paths: an "autocratic disaster" with high inequality and low output, and an "East Asian Miracle" with low inequality and high output. The analysis is supported by historical evidence from Britain, France, Germany, and Sweden, where the peak of the Kuznets curve coincides with the extension of the franchise. The paper contributes to the literature on political economy and growth, providing a novel explanation for the Kuznets curve and the different development paths observed in different societies.