The article "A Scientific Conception of Animal Welfare that Reflects Ethical Concerns" by D. Fraser, D. M. Weary, E. A. Pajor, and B. N. Milligan explores the ethical dimensions of animal welfare and proposes a scientific framework to address these concerns. The authors argue that animal welfare research must closely align with ethical concerns to effectively guide and interpret findings. They identify three overlapping ethical concerns: (1) promoting natural living through the development and use of animals' natural adaptations, (2) ensuring animals feel well by avoiding prolonged and intense negative states and experiencing normal pleasures, and (3) maintaining satisfactory health and normal functioning of physiological and behavioral systems. The authors critique various scientific conceptions of animal welfare, including those based on natural living, feelings, and functioning. They argue that these conceptions, while useful, do not fully capture the complexity of ethical concerns. Instead, they propose an integrative model that identifies three broad classes of problems arising when an animal's adaptations do not fully correspond to its current environment: (1) adaptations that no longer serve a significant function, (2) challenges for which the animal has no corresponding adaptation, and (3) inadequate adaptations despite their presence. This model aims to provide a more comprehensive framework for understanding and addressing ethical concerns in animal welfare, ensuring that scientific research is aligned with societal values and ethical principles.The article "A Scientific Conception of Animal Welfare that Reflects Ethical Concerns" by D. Fraser, D. M. Weary, E. A. Pajor, and B. N. Milligan explores the ethical dimensions of animal welfare and proposes a scientific framework to address these concerns. The authors argue that animal welfare research must closely align with ethical concerns to effectively guide and interpret findings. They identify three overlapping ethical concerns: (1) promoting natural living through the development and use of animals' natural adaptations, (2) ensuring animals feel well by avoiding prolonged and intense negative states and experiencing normal pleasures, and (3) maintaining satisfactory health and normal functioning of physiological and behavioral systems. The authors critique various scientific conceptions of animal welfare, including those based on natural living, feelings, and functioning. They argue that these conceptions, while useful, do not fully capture the complexity of ethical concerns. Instead, they propose an integrative model that identifies three broad classes of problems arising when an animal's adaptations do not fully correspond to its current environment: (1) adaptations that no longer serve a significant function, (2) challenges for which the animal has no corresponding adaptation, and (3) inadequate adaptations despite their presence. This model aims to provide a more comprehensive framework for understanding and addressing ethical concerns in animal welfare, ensuring that scientific research is aligned with societal values and ethical principles.