Susanna Schellenberg's paper defends the thesis that perceptual experience is fundamentally representational, addressing objections from austere relationalists. She argues that perceptual content can be both relational and representational, avoiding the objections that austere relationalists raise against representational views. Schellenberg presents a detailed argument for the content thesis, showing that most objections to it apply only to accounts of perceptual content where perceptual relations to the world play no explanatory role. She identifies four main objections from austere relationalists: indeterminacy, accuracy conditions, phenomenological, and epistemological objections. Schellenberg critiques each of these objections, demonstrating that they do not矛盾 the representational nature of perceptual experience. She proposes a version of the content thesis that acknowledges the insights of austere relationalism while maintaining that perceptual experience is fundamentally relational and representational. The paper concludes by defending the content thesis through a master argument, showing that if a subject is perceptually related to the world, then her experience has content that corresponds to how the world seems to her. This content can be understood as either accurate or inaccurate, depending on whether the world seems to her as it appears in her experience. Schellenberg also discusses the relationship between perceptual experience and its content, arguing that phenomenology supervenes on content rather than being identified with it.Susanna Schellenberg's paper defends the thesis that perceptual experience is fundamentally representational, addressing objections from austere relationalists. She argues that perceptual content can be both relational and representational, avoiding the objections that austere relationalists raise against representational views. Schellenberg presents a detailed argument for the content thesis, showing that most objections to it apply only to accounts of perceptual content where perceptual relations to the world play no explanatory role. She identifies four main objections from austere relationalists: indeterminacy, accuracy conditions, phenomenological, and epistemological objections. Schellenberg critiques each of these objections, demonstrating that they do not矛盾 the representational nature of perceptual experience. She proposes a version of the content thesis that acknowledges the insights of austere relationalism while maintaining that perceptual experience is fundamentally relational and representational. The paper concludes by defending the content thesis through a master argument, showing that if a subject is perceptually related to the world, then her experience has content that corresponds to how the world seems to her. This content can be understood as either accurate or inaccurate, depending on whether the world seems to her as it appears in her experience. Schellenberg also discusses the relationship between perceptual experience and its content, arguing that phenomenology supervenes on content rather than being identified with it.