This paper explores a theory of debt based on the inalienability of human capital, where an entrepreneur must raise funds from an investor but cannot commit to not withdrawing their human capital from the project. The possibility of default or withdrawal limits the total future indebtedness. The authors characterize the optimal repayment path and show how it is influenced by the maturity structure of the project's return stream and the durability and specificity of project assets. They find that some profitable projects may not be financed due to the entrepreneur's ability to repudiate the contract. The optimal repayment path is determined by the balance between the entrepreneur's need to maintain human capital and the investor's desire for secure returns. The results are consistent with conventional wisdom about the maturity structure of long-term debt contracts. The paper also discusses the indeterminacy in debt repayments when the discount rates of the entrepreneur and investor differ, leading to either the slowest or fastest repayment path depending on who has the higher discount rate. The analysis is extended to consider the impact of reinvestment opportunities for both the entrepreneur and the investor, leading to unique optimal repayment paths in certain scenarios.This paper explores a theory of debt based on the inalienability of human capital, where an entrepreneur must raise funds from an investor but cannot commit to not withdrawing their human capital from the project. The possibility of default or withdrawal limits the total future indebtedness. The authors characterize the optimal repayment path and show how it is influenced by the maturity structure of the project's return stream and the durability and specificity of project assets. They find that some profitable projects may not be financed due to the entrepreneur's ability to repudiate the contract. The optimal repayment path is determined by the balance between the entrepreneur's need to maintain human capital and the investor's desire for secure returns. The results are consistent with conventional wisdom about the maturity structure of long-term debt contracts. The paper also discusses the indeterminacy in debt repayments when the discount rates of the entrepreneur and investor differ, leading to either the slowest or fastest repayment path depending on who has the higher discount rate. The analysis is extended to consider the impact of reinvestment opportunities for both the entrepreneur and the investor, leading to unique optimal repayment paths in certain scenarios.