This paper develops a theory of political transitions, inspired by the experiences of Western Europe and Latin America. It argues that in nondemocratic societies, the initially disenfranchised poor can challenge power through social unrest or revolution, potentially forcing the elite to democratize. However, democracy may not consolidate because it is more redistributive than a nondemocratic regime, making the elite more likely to stage a coup. Highly unequal societies are less likely to consolidate democracy and may oscillate between regimes or remain in a nondemocratic, repressive state. The paper also discusses how asset redistribution, such as educational and land reforms, can be used to consolidate both democratic and nondemocratic regimes. The analysis highlights the role of inequality in political instability and the complex relationship between inequality and redistribution.This paper develops a theory of political transitions, inspired by the experiences of Western Europe and Latin America. It argues that in nondemocratic societies, the initially disenfranchised poor can challenge power through social unrest or revolution, potentially forcing the elite to democratize. However, democracy may not consolidate because it is more redistributive than a nondemocratic regime, making the elite more likely to stage a coup. Highly unequal societies are less likely to consolidate democracy and may oscillate between regimes or remain in a nondemocratic, repressive state. The paper also discusses how asset redistribution, such as educational and land reforms, can be used to consolidate both democratic and nondemocratic regimes. The analysis highlights the role of inequality in political instability and the complex relationship between inequality and redistribution.