Nancy Leveson's paper introduces a new accident model, the Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP), which is based on systems theory concepts. The model aims to provide a more comprehensive understanding of accidents, particularly system accidents, by focusing on the interaction of external disturbances, component failures, and dysfunctional interactions among system components. The model emphasizes the role of constraints, control loops, and process models in maintaining safety. It suggests that accidents occur when these constraints are not adequately enforced, leading to maladaptive changes in system behavior. The paper also discusses the limitations of traditional event-based models, which often fail to capture the complexity of accidents and the role of social and organizational factors. The STAMP model is designed to address these limitations by providing a theoretical foundation for new types of accident analysis, hazard analysis, accident prevention strategies, and performance monitoring. The paper concludes by highlighting the importance of understanding the socio-technical system and the need for a dynamic, process-oriented approach to safety management.Nancy Leveson's paper introduces a new accident model, the Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP), which is based on systems theory concepts. The model aims to provide a more comprehensive understanding of accidents, particularly system accidents, by focusing on the interaction of external disturbances, component failures, and dysfunctional interactions among system components. The model emphasizes the role of constraints, control loops, and process models in maintaining safety. It suggests that accidents occur when these constraints are not adequately enforced, leading to maladaptive changes in system behavior. The paper also discusses the limitations of traditional event-based models, which often fail to capture the complexity of accidents and the role of social and organizational factors. The STAMP model is designed to address these limitations by providing a theoretical foundation for new types of accident analysis, hazard analysis, accident prevention strategies, and performance monitoring. The paper concludes by highlighting the importance of understanding the socio-technical system and the need for a dynamic, process-oriented approach to safety management.