2007 | Southgate, Victoria and Senju, Atsushi and Csibra, Gergely
The study by Southgate, Senju, and Csibra (2007) investigates whether 2-year-old infants can attribute false beliefs to others and anticipate actions based on these beliefs. Using an eye-tracker, the researchers observed infants' looking behavior while they watched actions on a computer monitor. The results showed that 25-month-old infants correctly anticipated an actor's actions that could only be predicted if they had attributed a false belief to the actor. This challenges the long-held view that children under four years of age lack a theory of mind.
The study involved two conditions: false-belief I and false-belief II. In both conditions, the actor witnessed the hiding of a toy, which was later removed while the actor was not attending. The puppet then moved the toy to a different location, and the actor turned away. The infants were tested on their ability to anticipate where the actor would search for the toy. The results showed that infants looked longer at the correct location, indicating they anticipated the actor's search based on a false belief.
The study also addresses the issue of reality bias, where children's own knowledge of a situation may interfere with their ability to respond accurately. The researchers argue that the standard false belief task may not be the best measure of theory of mind because it requires abilities beyond understanding mental states. The current study suggests that infants can understand false beliefs and anticipate actions based on these beliefs, which is an important finding for understanding the development of theory of mind in young children. The results challenge the notion that children must undergo a conceptual revolution between 3 and 4 years of age to understand false beliefs. Instead, the study suggests that infants may be able to attribute false beliefs to others and anticipate actions based on these beliefs, indicating an early developing ability for epistemic state attribution.The study by Southgate, Senju, and Csibra (2007) investigates whether 2-year-old infants can attribute false beliefs to others and anticipate actions based on these beliefs. Using an eye-tracker, the researchers observed infants' looking behavior while they watched actions on a computer monitor. The results showed that 25-month-old infants correctly anticipated an actor's actions that could only be predicted if they had attributed a false belief to the actor. This challenges the long-held view that children under four years of age lack a theory of mind.
The study involved two conditions: false-belief I and false-belief II. In both conditions, the actor witnessed the hiding of a toy, which was later removed while the actor was not attending. The puppet then moved the toy to a different location, and the actor turned away. The infants were tested on their ability to anticipate where the actor would search for the toy. The results showed that infants looked longer at the correct location, indicating they anticipated the actor's search based on a false belief.
The study also addresses the issue of reality bias, where children's own knowledge of a situation may interfere with their ability to respond accurately. The researchers argue that the standard false belief task may not be the best measure of theory of mind because it requires abilities beyond understanding mental states. The current study suggests that infants can understand false beliefs and anticipate actions based on these beliefs, which is an important finding for understanding the development of theory of mind in young children. The results challenge the notion that children must undergo a conceptual revolution between 3 and 4 years of age to understand false beliefs. Instead, the study suggests that infants may be able to attribute false beliefs to others and anticipate actions based on these beliefs, indicating an early developing ability for epistemic state attribution.