This paper argues that quantitative and qualitative methods in educational research are not inherently incompatible, and that there is no good reason for educational researchers to fear combining them. The author challenges the "incompatibility thesis," which claims that the differences between quantitative and qualitative methods stem from opposing epistemological paradigms. Instead, the author proposes the "compatibility thesis," which suggests that these methods can be integrated and are not epistemologically incoherent. The paper discusses how differences between quantitative and qualitative methods can be explained by differences in research interests and assumptions, rather than by fundamental epistemological differences. It also argues that the incompatibility thesis is based on an implicit assumption that abstract paradigms should determine research methods in a one-way fashion, which is untenable. Instead, paradigms should be evaluated based on how well they inform and are informed by research methods. The author also addresses criticisms of pragmatism, which is the philosophical stance used to support the compatibility thesis. Pragmatism is often accused of being relativistic and irrational, but the author argues that these criticisms are exaggerated and that pragmatism offers a more balanced view of truth and knowledge. The paper concludes that quantitative and qualitative methods are inextricably intertwined and that the incompatibility thesis is based on a misunderstanding of the relationship between research methods and epistemological paradigms. The author advocates for a pragmatic approach that allows for the combination of quantitative and qualitative methods in educational research.This paper argues that quantitative and qualitative methods in educational research are not inherently incompatible, and that there is no good reason for educational researchers to fear combining them. The author challenges the "incompatibility thesis," which claims that the differences between quantitative and qualitative methods stem from opposing epistemological paradigms. Instead, the author proposes the "compatibility thesis," which suggests that these methods can be integrated and are not epistemologically incoherent. The paper discusses how differences between quantitative and qualitative methods can be explained by differences in research interests and assumptions, rather than by fundamental epistemological differences. It also argues that the incompatibility thesis is based on an implicit assumption that abstract paradigms should determine research methods in a one-way fashion, which is untenable. Instead, paradigms should be evaluated based on how well they inform and are informed by research methods. The author also addresses criticisms of pragmatism, which is the philosophical stance used to support the compatibility thesis. Pragmatism is often accused of being relativistic and irrational, but the author argues that these criticisms are exaggerated and that pragmatism offers a more balanced view of truth and knowledge. The paper concludes that quantitative and qualitative methods are inextricably intertwined and that the incompatibility thesis is based on a misunderstanding of the relationship between research methods and epistemological paradigms. The author advocates for a pragmatic approach that allows for the combination of quantitative and qualitative methods in educational research.