This paper by Werner GÜTH, Rolf SCHMITTBERGER, and Bernd SCHWARZE explores the experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining, a type of bargaining game where the outcome is restricted to two possible results before the final decision. The authors focus on two-player, two-stage games to illustrate the ultimatum aspect, distinguishing between "easy games" where a fixed amount is distributed and "complicated games" where chips of different values are allocated. They conducted two main experiments and a special experiment to investigate how subjects' demands as player 1 relate to their acceptance decisions as player 2. In easy games, the optimal decision behavior is straightforward: player 1 demands a minimal amount to ensure a positive payoff, while player 2 accepts if the offer is fair. In complicated games, the optimal solution is more complex, involving the division of chips to maximize payoffs for both players. The authors found that subjects often rely on what they consider fair or justified results, and they are willing to punish opponents who ask for too much. In complicated games, there is a stronger tendency to exploit the ultimatum aspect, with players 1 more likely to suggest unbalanced payoffs and players 2 more likely to block such outcomes. The study concludes that ultimatum bargaining games are useful for understanding strategic interaction through anticipation, and that cooperative game theory is limited in explaining such behavior. The authors suggest further experiments with higher amounts and different game structures to deepen the understanding of ultimatum bargaining.This paper by Werner GÜTH, Rolf SCHMITTBERGER, and Bernd SCHWARZE explores the experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining, a type of bargaining game where the outcome is restricted to two possible results before the final decision. The authors focus on two-player, two-stage games to illustrate the ultimatum aspect, distinguishing between "easy games" where a fixed amount is distributed and "complicated games" where chips of different values are allocated. They conducted two main experiments and a special experiment to investigate how subjects' demands as player 1 relate to their acceptance decisions as player 2. In easy games, the optimal decision behavior is straightforward: player 1 demands a minimal amount to ensure a positive payoff, while player 2 accepts if the offer is fair. In complicated games, the optimal solution is more complex, involving the division of chips to maximize payoffs for both players. The authors found that subjects often rely on what they consider fair or justified results, and they are willing to punish opponents who ask for too much. In complicated games, there is a stronger tendency to exploit the ultimatum aspect, with players 1 more likely to suggest unbalanced payoffs and players 2 more likely to block such outcomes. The study concludes that ultimatum bargaining games are useful for understanding strategic interaction through anticipation, and that cooperative game theory is limited in explaining such behavior. The authors suggest further experiments with higher amounts and different game structures to deepen the understanding of ultimatum bargaining.