The article by Colin Camerer and Richard H. Thaler explores the anomalies in economic theory, particularly focusing on the ultimatum game and the dictator game. The ultimatum game involves two players where one (the Proposer) divides a sum of money with the other (the Responder), and the Responder can either accept or reject the offer. The game's outcomes often deviate from the predictions of game theory, which assumes self-interest. For instance, offers typically average 30-40% of the total, and offers below 20% are frequently rejected. The authors discuss the robustness of these findings, noting that they remain consistent across different experimental settings and cultural contexts. They also examine the role of information asymmetry and social distance in influencing behavior. For example, when the Responder knows the relative values of the chips, offers tend to be higher, and rejections are less frequent. The article reviews several theoretical models that attempt to explain these anomalies, including models that incorporate social comparison, fairness, and learning. However, these models have limitations, particularly in explaining the dictator game data and the impact of information variation. The authors conclude that the observed behavior in these games is more about manners and social norms than altruism. They argue that people act based on perceived norms of fairness and reciprocity, even in one-shot interactions. They emphasize the importance of incorporating these social factors into economic theory and suggest that future research should focus on how real people interact, rather than making excuses for observed anomalies.The article by Colin Camerer and Richard H. Thaler explores the anomalies in economic theory, particularly focusing on the ultimatum game and the dictator game. The ultimatum game involves two players where one (the Proposer) divides a sum of money with the other (the Responder), and the Responder can either accept or reject the offer. The game's outcomes often deviate from the predictions of game theory, which assumes self-interest. For instance, offers typically average 30-40% of the total, and offers below 20% are frequently rejected. The authors discuss the robustness of these findings, noting that they remain consistent across different experimental settings and cultural contexts. They also examine the role of information asymmetry and social distance in influencing behavior. For example, when the Responder knows the relative values of the chips, offers tend to be higher, and rejections are less frequent. The article reviews several theoretical models that attempt to explain these anomalies, including models that incorporate social comparison, fairness, and learning. However, these models have limitations, particularly in explaining the dictator game data and the impact of information variation. The authors conclude that the observed behavior in these games is more about manners and social norms than altruism. They argue that people act based on perceived norms of fairness and reciprocity, even in one-shot interactions. They emphasize the importance of incorporating these social factors into economic theory and suggest that future research should focus on how real people interact, rather than making excuses for observed anomalies.