This paper presents a novel approach to attribute-based data sharing with attribute revocation, focusing on the challenges of efficiently revoking user attributes in Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE). The proposed solution integrates proxy re-encryption with CP-ABE, enabling the authority to delegate most of the laborious tasks of attribute revocation to semi-trustable proxy servers. This approach minimizes the effort required by the authority and ensures that revocation operations are efficient and secure. The key contributions of the paper include: (1) defining attribute revocation in CP-ABE with honest-but-curious servers and formulating a security model that reflects possible attacks; (2) enabling the authority to revoke any attribute of users at any time while placing minimal load on the authority; (3) proving the scheme's security under the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption; and (4) showing that the method is applicable to Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE), where the authority can revoke any partial access privilege of users. The paper also discusses the applicability of the proposed method to KP-ABE, where the system administrator can revoke a user's access privilege on specific content attributes. The construction of the KP-ABE scheme is similar to the CP-ABE scheme, with the authority redefining the master key component and delegating the task of updating secret keys to proxy servers. The paper further addresses the issue of attribute revocation in CP-ABE, highlighting the challenges of efficiently revoking user attributes in one-to-many communication systems. The proposed solution leverages proxy re-encryption to enable efficient and secure revocation, ensuring that the system remains secure and efficient even with the presence of semi-trustable proxy servers. The scheme is proven to be secure against chosen ciphertext attacks and is applicable to both CP-ABE and KP-ABE.This paper presents a novel approach to attribute-based data sharing with attribute revocation, focusing on the challenges of efficiently revoking user attributes in Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE). The proposed solution integrates proxy re-encryption with CP-ABE, enabling the authority to delegate most of the laborious tasks of attribute revocation to semi-trustable proxy servers. This approach minimizes the effort required by the authority and ensures that revocation operations are efficient and secure. The key contributions of the paper include: (1) defining attribute revocation in CP-ABE with honest-but-curious servers and formulating a security model that reflects possible attacks; (2) enabling the authority to revoke any attribute of users at any time while placing minimal load on the authority; (3) proving the scheme's security under the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption; and (4) showing that the method is applicable to Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE), where the authority can revoke any partial access privilege of users. The paper also discusses the applicability of the proposed method to KP-ABE, where the system administrator can revoke a user's access privilege on specific content attributes. The construction of the KP-ABE scheme is similar to the CP-ABE scheme, with the authority redefining the master key component and delegating the task of updating secret keys to proxy servers. The paper further addresses the issue of attribute revocation in CP-ABE, highlighting the challenges of efficiently revoking user attributes in one-to-many communication systems. The proposed solution leverages proxy re-encryption to enable efficient and secure revocation, ensuring that the system remains secure and efficient even with the presence of semi-trustable proxy servers. The scheme is proven to be secure against chosen ciphertext attacks and is applicable to both CP-ABE and KP-ABE.