The paper distinguishes between two core meanings of "utility": "decision utility," which refers to the weight of an outcome in a decision, and "experienced utility," which refers to hedonic quality as used by Bentham. Experienced utility can be reported in real time (instant utility) or through retrospective evaluations of past episodes (remembered utility). The authors argue that experienced utility is measurable and distinct from decision utility, despite common arguments against it. They propose a formal normative theory of total experienced utility for temporally extended outcomes and discuss the implications for empirical research. The introduction highlights the historical evolution of the concept of utility, noting that Bentham's usage has been largely replaced by a modern interpretation in economics and decision theory. The authors argue that experienced utility is both measurable and empirically distinct from decision utility, using an example of a patient with amnesia to illustrate the difference between decision utility and experienced utility. The paper then presents a normative theory of total utility, which yields rules for evaluating temporally extended outcomes based on a temporal profile of instant utility. This theory assumes time-neutral weighting of instants and derives temporal integration as the principle of global evaluation. The authors discuss the consequences of accepting experienced utility as a measure of outcome quality and review results on the accuracy of predicted utility. The paper concludes by discussing the normative, measurement, and empirical issues raised by the study of experienced utility, emphasizing the importance of direct measurement and the potential for richer models of economic decisions.The paper distinguishes between two core meanings of "utility": "decision utility," which refers to the weight of an outcome in a decision, and "experienced utility," which refers to hedonic quality as used by Bentham. Experienced utility can be reported in real time (instant utility) or through retrospective evaluations of past episodes (remembered utility). The authors argue that experienced utility is measurable and distinct from decision utility, despite common arguments against it. They propose a formal normative theory of total experienced utility for temporally extended outcomes and discuss the implications for empirical research. The introduction highlights the historical evolution of the concept of utility, noting that Bentham's usage has been largely replaced by a modern interpretation in economics and decision theory. The authors argue that experienced utility is both measurable and empirically distinct from decision utility, using an example of a patient with amnesia to illustrate the difference between decision utility and experienced utility. The paper then presents a normative theory of total utility, which yields rules for evaluating temporally extended outcomes based on a temporal profile of instant utility. This theory assumes time-neutral weighting of instants and derives temporal integration as the principle of global evaluation. The authors discuss the consequences of accepting experienced utility as a measure of outcome quality and review results on the accuracy of predicted utility. The paper concludes by discussing the normative, measurement, and empirical issues raised by the study of experienced utility, emphasizing the importance of direct measurement and the potential for richer models of economic decisions.