This paper models balanced-budget redistribution between socio-economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties. It examines the uniqueness of equilibrium and provides a sufficient condition for existence, requiring sufficient stochastic heterogeneity in party preferences among voters. The paper also investigates the validity of Hotelling's principle of minimum differentiation and Director's Law under different hypotheses about administrative costs and voter behavior. It contrasts two policy strategies: expected-plurality maximization and maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality. The analysis assumes fixed and known incomes, allowing for feasible lump-sum taxation, but permits constraints on tax/transfer differentiation between individuals. The study focuses on redistribution between socio-economic groups, allowing both vertical and horizontal redistributions. The Median Voter Theorem does not apply due to the multi-dimensionality of such redistributions. The paper considers a representative democracy where two political parties compete for votes through political programs, including fiscal redistribution schemes. Other aspects of the parties' programs are assumed fixed, but differences in other areas are important for the outcome of party competition. The analysis assumes that voters derive utility from consumption and from policies unrelated to consumption. Parties assign probability distributions to individuals' party preferences, assuming they have access to the same information. The paper highlights that consumption is relatively simple and visible, while political preferences are more complex and difficult to observe. Voters choose the party that best promotes their welfare, and parties select redistribution policies to maximize their expected plurality. The political system is thus formed by the interaction between self-interested, maximizing agents. The paper explores the explanatory power of the 'economic man' paradigm in political competition.This paper models balanced-budget redistribution between socio-economic groups as the outcome of electoral competition between two political parties. It examines the uniqueness of equilibrium and provides a sufficient condition for existence, requiring sufficient stochastic heterogeneity in party preferences among voters. The paper also investigates the validity of Hotelling's principle of minimum differentiation and Director's Law under different hypotheses about administrative costs and voter behavior. It contrasts two policy strategies: expected-plurality maximization and maximizing the probability of gaining a plurality. The analysis assumes fixed and known incomes, allowing for feasible lump-sum taxation, but permits constraints on tax/transfer differentiation between individuals. The study focuses on redistribution between socio-economic groups, allowing both vertical and horizontal redistributions. The Median Voter Theorem does not apply due to the multi-dimensionality of such redistributions. The paper considers a representative democracy where two political parties compete for votes through political programs, including fiscal redistribution schemes. Other aspects of the parties' programs are assumed fixed, but differences in other areas are important for the outcome of party competition. The analysis assumes that voters derive utility from consumption and from policies unrelated to consumption. Parties assign probability distributions to individuals' party preferences, assuming they have access to the same information. The paper highlights that consumption is relatively simple and visible, while political preferences are more complex and difficult to observe. Voters choose the party that best promotes their welfare, and parties select redistribution policies to maximize their expected plurality. The political system is thus formed by the interaction between self-interested, maximizing agents. The paper explores the explanatory power of the 'economic man' paradigm in political competition.