James D. Fearon's article explores the dynamics of international cooperation, emphasizing the interplay between bargaining and enforcement. He challenges the traditional cooperation theory, which often simplifies international issues as either coordination or Prisoners' Dilemma games. Fearon argues that international cooperation typically involves two phases: first, a bargaining phase where states negotiate the terms of cooperation, and second, an enforcement phase where they must sustain the agreement against defection. He develops a game-theoretic model where states bargain over which agreement to enforce, and then face a repeated Prisoners' Dilemma in the enforcement phase. Fearon highlights that the "shadow of the future"—the expected length of future interactions—can have dual effects. While it makes cooperation more sustainable by encouraging long-term thinking, it can also incentivize states to delay agreement to secure better terms. This creates a tension between the desire to enforce agreements and the incentive to bargain harder. The article also discusses the empirical implications of these theories, suggesting that cooperation theory may better explain early Cold War arms competition than previously thought. Fearon critiques the simplification of international issues into binary strategic structures, arguing that such models are inadequate for capturing the complexity of real-world bargaining and enforcement problems. He proposes that international cooperation involves both bargaining over the terms of cooperation and the enforcement of those terms, with the two phases interacting in complex ways. The article also considers the role of incomplete information in bargaining, showing that uncertainty about the other side's preferences can lead to costly delays. The analysis concludes that the shadow of the future is a critical factor in both bargaining and enforcement. While a longer shadow can make cooperation more sustainable, it can also lead to more delay in reaching agreements. The article emphasizes the importance of understanding these dynamics for analyzing international cooperation and the design of effective international institutions.James D. Fearon's article explores the dynamics of international cooperation, emphasizing the interplay between bargaining and enforcement. He challenges the traditional cooperation theory, which often simplifies international issues as either coordination or Prisoners' Dilemma games. Fearon argues that international cooperation typically involves two phases: first, a bargaining phase where states negotiate the terms of cooperation, and second, an enforcement phase where they must sustain the agreement against defection. He develops a game-theoretic model where states bargain over which agreement to enforce, and then face a repeated Prisoners' Dilemma in the enforcement phase. Fearon highlights that the "shadow of the future"—the expected length of future interactions—can have dual effects. While it makes cooperation more sustainable by encouraging long-term thinking, it can also incentivize states to delay agreement to secure better terms. This creates a tension between the desire to enforce agreements and the incentive to bargain harder. The article also discusses the empirical implications of these theories, suggesting that cooperation theory may better explain early Cold War arms competition than previously thought. Fearon critiques the simplification of international issues into binary strategic structures, arguing that such models are inadequate for capturing the complexity of real-world bargaining and enforcement problems. He proposes that international cooperation involves both bargaining over the terms of cooperation and the enforcement of those terms, with the two phases interacting in complex ways. The article also considers the role of incomplete information in bargaining, showing that uncertainty about the other side's preferences can lead to costly delays. The analysis concludes that the shadow of the future is a critical factor in both bargaining and enforcement. While a longer shadow can make cooperation more sustainable, it can also lead to more delay in reaching agreements. The article emphasizes the importance of understanding these dynamics for analyzing international cooperation and the design of effective international institutions.