James D. Fearon's article "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation" explores the dynamics of international cooperation, particularly in the context of "cooperation theory" or "neoliberal institutionalism." The article challenges the traditional realist perspective that cooperation is difficult under anarchy and argues that understanding international cooperation as having a common strategic structure is more accurate and theoretically fruitful. Fearon suggests that international cooperation typically involves two phases: bargaining and enforcement. The bargaining phase involves states negotiating over the terms of cooperation, while the enforcement phase is modeled as a repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, where states must monitor and enforce the agreed-upon deal. Fearon's model shows that the interaction between bargaining and enforcement can have interesting implications. While a longer "shadow of the future" (longer-term considerations) can make enforcement easier, it can also incentivize states to bargain harder, delaying agreement in hopes of getting a better deal. This suggests that the shadow of the future has a dual effect: it facilitates cooperation but also encourages states to delay bargaining. The article also discusses the empirical implications of these theoretical claims, arguing that the theory better explains early Cold War arms competition than traditional cooperation theory. It concludes by comparing the bargaining problem to the relative-gains problem and noting implications for understanding international regimes.James D. Fearon's article "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation" explores the dynamics of international cooperation, particularly in the context of "cooperation theory" or "neoliberal institutionalism." The article challenges the traditional realist perspective that cooperation is difficult under anarchy and argues that understanding international cooperation as having a common strategic structure is more accurate and theoretically fruitful. Fearon suggests that international cooperation typically involves two phases: bargaining and enforcement. The bargaining phase involves states negotiating over the terms of cooperation, while the enforcement phase is modeled as a repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, where states must monitor and enforce the agreed-upon deal. Fearon's model shows that the interaction between bargaining and enforcement can have interesting implications. While a longer "shadow of the future" (longer-term considerations) can make enforcement easier, it can also incentivize states to bargain harder, delaying agreement in hopes of getting a better deal. This suggests that the shadow of the future has a dual effect: it facilitates cooperation but also encourages states to delay bargaining. The article also discusses the empirical implications of these theoretical claims, arguing that the theory better explains early Cold War arms competition than traditional cooperation theory. It concludes by comparing the bargaining problem to the relative-gains problem and noting implications for understanding international regimes.