Derrick A. Bell, Jr. discusses the Brown v. Board of Education decision and the interest-convergence dilemma. After Brown, Professor Herbert Wechsler questioned whether the Supreme Court's decision could be justified on neutral principles. He argued that Brown arbitrarily traded the rights of whites not to associate with blacks for the rights of blacks to associate with whites. Bell suggests that no conflict of interest actually existed; for a brief period, the interests of the races converged to make the Brown decision inevitable. However, recent Supreme Court decisions suggest a growing divergence of interests that makes integration less feasible. Bell suggests that the interest of blacks in quality education might now be better served by concentration on improving the quality of existing schools, whether desegregated or all-black. In 1954, the Supreme Court handed down the landmark decision Brown v. Board of Education, which ordered the end of state-mandated racial segregation of public schools. Brown transformed blacks from beggars pleading for decent treatment to citizens demanding equal treatment under the law as their constitutionally recognized right. However, today, most black children attend public schools that are both racially isolated and inferior. Demographic patterns, white flight, and the inability of the courts to effect the necessary degree of social reform render further progress in implementing Brown almost impossible. Shortly after Brown, Professor Herbert Wechsler rendered a sharp and nagging criticism of the decision. He welcomed its result but criticized its lack of a principled basis. Wechsler's views have since been persuasively refuted, yet within them lie ideas which may help to explain the disappointment of Brown and what can be done to renew its promise. In this Comment, I plan to take a new look at Wechsler within the context of the subsequent desegregation campaign. By doing so, I hope to offer an explanation of why school desegregation has in large part failed and what can be done to bring about change. Professor Wechsler's search for neutral principles in Brown led him to conclude that the Court in Brown must have rested its holding on the view that racial segregation is, in principle, a denial of equality to the minority against whom it is directed. However, Wechsler found this argument untenable as well, because, among other difficulties, it seemed to require an inquiry into the motives of the legislature, a practice generally foreclosed to the courts. Wechsler reviewed and rejected the possibility that Brown was based on a declaration that the fourteenth amendment barred all racial lines in legislation. He also doubted that the opinion relied upon a factual determination that segregation caused injury to black children, since evidence as to such harm was both inadequate and conflicting. Rather, Wechsler concluded, the Court in Brown must have rested its holding on the view that racial segregation is, in principle, a denial of equality to the minority against whom it is directed. After dismissing these arguments, Wechsler then asserted that the legal issue in state-imposedDerrick A. Bell, Jr. discusses the Brown v. Board of Education decision and the interest-convergence dilemma. After Brown, Professor Herbert Wechsler questioned whether the Supreme Court's decision could be justified on neutral principles. He argued that Brown arbitrarily traded the rights of whites not to associate with blacks for the rights of blacks to associate with whites. Bell suggests that no conflict of interest actually existed; for a brief period, the interests of the races converged to make the Brown decision inevitable. However, recent Supreme Court decisions suggest a growing divergence of interests that makes integration less feasible. Bell suggests that the interest of blacks in quality education might now be better served by concentration on improving the quality of existing schools, whether desegregated or all-black. In 1954, the Supreme Court handed down the landmark decision Brown v. Board of Education, which ordered the end of state-mandated racial segregation of public schools. Brown transformed blacks from beggars pleading for decent treatment to citizens demanding equal treatment under the law as their constitutionally recognized right. However, today, most black children attend public schools that are both racially isolated and inferior. Demographic patterns, white flight, and the inability of the courts to effect the necessary degree of social reform render further progress in implementing Brown almost impossible. Shortly after Brown, Professor Herbert Wechsler rendered a sharp and nagging criticism of the decision. He welcomed its result but criticized its lack of a principled basis. Wechsler's views have since been persuasively refuted, yet within them lie ideas which may help to explain the disappointment of Brown and what can be done to renew its promise. In this Comment, I plan to take a new look at Wechsler within the context of the subsequent desegregation campaign. By doing so, I hope to offer an explanation of why school desegregation has in large part failed and what can be done to bring about change. Professor Wechsler's search for neutral principles in Brown led him to conclude that the Court in Brown must have rested its holding on the view that racial segregation is, in principle, a denial of equality to the minority against whom it is directed. However, Wechsler found this argument untenable as well, because, among other difficulties, it seemed to require an inquiry into the motives of the legislature, a practice generally foreclosed to the courts. Wechsler reviewed and rejected the possibility that Brown was based on a declaration that the fourteenth amendment barred all racial lines in legislation. He also doubted that the opinion relied upon a factual determination that segregation caused injury to black children, since evidence as to such harm was both inadequate and conflicting. Rather, Wechsler concluded, the Court in Brown must have rested its holding on the view that racial segregation is, in principle, a denial of equality to the minority against whom it is directed. After dismissing these arguments, Wechsler then asserted that the legal issue in state-imposed