This paper examines the relationship between bureaucratic structure and performance in less developed countries (LDCs). The authors argue that several structural features of effective state bureaucracies—competitive salaries, internal promotion, career stability, and meritocratic recruitment—are key determinants of bureaucratic performance. They collect data on these features for 35 LDCs and find that these measures are statistically significant determinants of ratings provided by country risk agencies on corruption and red tape. Meritocratic recruitment is identified as the most important structural feature, followed by internal promotion and career stability. The importance of competitive salaries is less clear. The study also explores the robustness of these findings and suggests that longitudinal analysis could provide further insights into the efficacy of administrative reforms in LDCs.This paper examines the relationship between bureaucratic structure and performance in less developed countries (LDCs). The authors argue that several structural features of effective state bureaucracies—competitive salaries, internal promotion, career stability, and meritocratic recruitment—are key determinants of bureaucratic performance. They collect data on these features for 35 LDCs and find that these measures are statistically significant determinants of ratings provided by country risk agencies on corruption and red tape. Meritocratic recruitment is identified as the most important structural feature, followed by internal promotion and career stability. The importance of competitive salaries is less clear. The study also explores the robustness of these findings and suggests that longitudinal analysis could provide further insights into the efficacy of administrative reforms in LDCs.