Children can use natural kind categories to make inductive inferences even when category membership conflicts with appearances. Susan A. Gelman and Ellen M. Markman explore how young children, who rely on perceptual appearances and have limited scientific knowledge, use categories to support inductive reasoning. In an experiment, children were shown two objects and told a new fact about each. They then had to infer which fact applied to a third object that looked like one of the first two but was given the same category label as the other. The results showed that children used category membership to support inductive inferences, even when the object looked different from others in the category. This suggests that children have begun to differentiate between properties that support induction within a category (e.g., means of breathing) and those determined by perceptual appearances (e.g., weight). The study also found that children are not solely dependent on perceptual similarity for drawing inferences. For example, in a task where children were asked whether a mechanical monkey could breathe, eat, and have babies, children did not generalize these properties to the mechanical monkey, even though it looked like a real monkey. This indicates that children have differentiated living things from nonliving things. The study also found that children can use category membership to support inductive inferences even when the object looks different from others in the category. This suggests that children have begun to understand the structure of natural kind categories. The study also found that children are not always selective in the kinds of inferences they make. Some children may overgeneralize the importance of category labels, assuming that a legless lizard can run as quickly as a four-legged lizard or that a large pearl weighs as much as a smaller pearl. However, other children are more selective and only draw inferences based on relevant properties such as internal structure. The study concludes that children have begun to differentiate between properties that support induction within a category and those determined by perceptual appearances. This suggests that children have a more sophisticated understanding of categories than previously thought. The study also highlights the importance of category membership in supporting inductive inferences, even when the object looks different from others in the category. This suggests that children have a more nuanced understanding of categories than previously thought. The study also shows that children can use category membership to support inductive inferences even when the object looks different from others in the category. This suggests that children have a more sophisticated understanding of categories than previously thought. The study also highlights the importance of category membership in supporting inductive inferences, even when the object looks different from others in the category. This suggests that children have a more nuanced understanding of categories than previously thought.Children can use natural kind categories to make inductive inferences even when category membership conflicts with appearances. Susan A. Gelman and Ellen M. Markman explore how young children, who rely on perceptual appearances and have limited scientific knowledge, use categories to support inductive reasoning. In an experiment, children were shown two objects and told a new fact about each. They then had to infer which fact applied to a third object that looked like one of the first two but was given the same category label as the other. The results showed that children used category membership to support inductive inferences, even when the object looked different from others in the category. This suggests that children have begun to differentiate between properties that support induction within a category (e.g., means of breathing) and those determined by perceptual appearances (e.g., weight). The study also found that children are not solely dependent on perceptual similarity for drawing inferences. For example, in a task where children were asked whether a mechanical monkey could breathe, eat, and have babies, children did not generalize these properties to the mechanical monkey, even though it looked like a real monkey. This indicates that children have differentiated living things from nonliving things. The study also found that children can use category membership to support inductive inferences even when the object looks different from others in the category. This suggests that children have begun to understand the structure of natural kind categories. The study also found that children are not always selective in the kinds of inferences they make. Some children may overgeneralize the importance of category labels, assuming that a legless lizard can run as quickly as a four-legged lizard or that a large pearl weighs as much as a smaller pearl. However, other children are more selective and only draw inferences based on relevant properties such as internal structure. The study concludes that children have begun to differentiate between properties that support induction within a category and those determined by perceptual appearances. This suggests that children have a more sophisticated understanding of categories than previously thought. The study also highlights the importance of category membership in supporting inductive inferences, even when the object looks different from others in the category. This suggests that children have a more nuanced understanding of categories than previously thought. The study also shows that children can use category membership to support inductive inferences even when the object looks different from others in the category. This suggests that children have a more sophisticated understanding of categories than previously thought. The study also highlights the importance of category membership in supporting inductive inferences, even when the object looks different from others in the category. This suggests that children have a more nuanced understanding of categories than previously thought.