This paper analyzes the investment analyses of 67 portfolio investments by 11 venture capital (VC) firms. VCs consider the attractiveness and risks of the business, management, and deal terms as well as expected post-investment monitoring. The study considers the relation of the analyses to the contractual terms. Greater internal and external risks are associated with more VC cash flow rights, VC control rights; greater internal risk, also with more contingencies for the entrepreneur; and greater complexity, with less contingent compensation. Finally, expected VC monitoring and support are related to the contracts. These results are interpreted in relation to financial contracting theories. The paper focuses on the information collection process and the relation between that process and the ensuing financial contracts. It studies a sample of VC investments in portfolio companies. The VCs prepare detailed investment analyses or memoranda for the other partners. The paper analyzes the investment memoranda from 11 VC partnerships for investments in 67 companies. It complements the analysis with information from the company business plans, data on the financial contracts from Kaplan and Strömberg (2001), and data on the subsequent performance of the companies. The paper finds that VCs play a significant role in shaping and recruiting the senior management team. In at least half of the investments, the VC expects to play an important role in recruiting management. In more than one-third of the investments, the VC expects to provide value-added services such as strategic advice or customer introductions. These results support and complement the results in Hellman and Puri (2000 and 2002). The paper considers how the assessments in the VCs' analyses interact with the design of the financial contracts. It focuses on the risks or uncertainties identified by the VCs in each transaction, dividing them into risks that are: (1) associated with external uncertainty – the relevant information is external to the firm and, we argue it is more likely that the VC and the entrepreneur are equally informed; (2) associated with internal uncertainty – the relevant information is internal to the firm and, we argue it is more likely that the VC is less informed than the entrepreneur; and (3) associated with complexity. Greater external and internal risks are associated with more VC ownership, more VC control, and more contingent compensation. Greater internal risk is also associated with more contingent financing. Greater complexity is associated with less contingent compensation. These results are interpreted in relation to financial contracting theories. The paper relates the financial contracts to expected VC actions. VCs are more likely to strengthen the management teams as VC control increases. This result is consistent with theories such as Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) in which VC board control is necessary for management intervention. VCs value-added services are increasingly likely as VC cash flow rights increase, but are not related to VC board control. This is consistent with the double-sided moral hazard theories, such as Casamatta (200This paper analyzes the investment analyses of 67 portfolio investments by 11 venture capital (VC) firms. VCs consider the attractiveness and risks of the business, management, and deal terms as well as expected post-investment monitoring. The study considers the relation of the analyses to the contractual terms. Greater internal and external risks are associated with more VC cash flow rights, VC control rights; greater internal risk, also with more contingencies for the entrepreneur; and greater complexity, with less contingent compensation. Finally, expected VC monitoring and support are related to the contracts. These results are interpreted in relation to financial contracting theories. The paper focuses on the information collection process and the relation between that process and the ensuing financial contracts. It studies a sample of VC investments in portfolio companies. The VCs prepare detailed investment analyses or memoranda for the other partners. The paper analyzes the investment memoranda from 11 VC partnerships for investments in 67 companies. It complements the analysis with information from the company business plans, data on the financial contracts from Kaplan and Strömberg (2001), and data on the subsequent performance of the companies. The paper finds that VCs play a significant role in shaping and recruiting the senior management team. In at least half of the investments, the VC expects to play an important role in recruiting management. In more than one-third of the investments, the VC expects to provide value-added services such as strategic advice or customer introductions. These results support and complement the results in Hellman and Puri (2000 and 2002). The paper considers how the assessments in the VCs' analyses interact with the design of the financial contracts. It focuses on the risks or uncertainties identified by the VCs in each transaction, dividing them into risks that are: (1) associated with external uncertainty – the relevant information is external to the firm and, we argue it is more likely that the VC and the entrepreneur are equally informed; (2) associated with internal uncertainty – the relevant information is internal to the firm and, we argue it is more likely that the VC is less informed than the entrepreneur; and (3) associated with complexity. Greater external and internal risks are associated with more VC ownership, more VC control, and more contingent compensation. Greater internal risk is also associated with more contingent financing. Greater complexity is associated with less contingent compensation. These results are interpreted in relation to financial contracting theories. The paper relates the financial contracts to expected VC actions. VCs are more likely to strengthen the management teams as VC control increases. This result is consistent with theories such as Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) in which VC board control is necessary for management intervention. VCs value-added services are increasingly likely as VC cash flow rights increase, but are not related to VC board control. This is consistent with the double-sided moral hazard theories, such as Casamatta (200