Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment. This study tests a dual-process theory of moral judgment, proposing that utilitarian judgments involve controlled cognitive processes, while non-utilitarian judgments are driven by automatic emotional responses. Participants were presented with moral dilemmas under cognitive load (digit-search task) and a control condition. Utilitarian judgments (favoring the sacrifice of one life to save several) were slower under load, indicating interference from cognitive demands. Non-utilitarian judgments were not affected. This supports the idea that utilitarian judgments require more cognitive resources. The results suggest that controlled cognitive processes play a key role in utilitarian moral judgment, while emotional responses drive non-utilitarian judgments. The findings provide direct evidence for the influence of controlled cognitive processes in moral judgment, particularly in utilitarian contexts. The study highlights the importance of cognitive control in moral decision-making and suggests that cognitive load can disrupt utilitarian reasoning. The results also indicate that individuals vary in their ability to process utilitarian judgments under cognitive demands. The study contributes to the understanding of the dual-process model of moral judgment, emphasizing the role of controlled cognition in utilitarian decisions.Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment. This study tests a dual-process theory of moral judgment, proposing that utilitarian judgments involve controlled cognitive processes, while non-utilitarian judgments are driven by automatic emotional responses. Participants were presented with moral dilemmas under cognitive load (digit-search task) and a control condition. Utilitarian judgments (favoring the sacrifice of one life to save several) were slower under load, indicating interference from cognitive demands. Non-utilitarian judgments were not affected. This supports the idea that utilitarian judgments require more cognitive resources. The results suggest that controlled cognitive processes play a key role in utilitarian moral judgment, while emotional responses drive non-utilitarian judgments. The findings provide direct evidence for the influence of controlled cognitive processes in moral judgment, particularly in utilitarian contexts. The study highlights the importance of cognitive control in moral decision-making and suggests that cognitive load can disrupt utilitarian reasoning. The results also indicate that individuals vary in their ability to process utilitarian judgments under cognitive demands. The study contributes to the understanding of the dual-process model of moral judgment, emphasizing the role of controlled cognition in utilitarian decisions.