This study tests a dual-process theory of moral judgment, which posits that utilitarian moral judgments (approving of harmful actions that maximize good consequences) are driven by controlled cognitive processes, while non-utilitarian judgments (characteristically deontological) are driven by automatic emotional responses. The authors manipulate cognitive load to selectively interfere with utilitarian judgments, finding that increasing cognitive load increases response time (RT) for utilitarian judgments but not for non-utilitarian judgments. This selective interference provides direct evidence for the influence of controlled cognitive processes in moral judgment, specifically in utilitarian judgments. The results support the hypothesis that utilitarian judgments are more resistant to cognitive load than non-utilitarian judgments, suggesting that controlled cognitive processes play a crucial role in ex ante moral judgment.This study tests a dual-process theory of moral judgment, which posits that utilitarian moral judgments (approving of harmful actions that maximize good consequences) are driven by controlled cognitive processes, while non-utilitarian judgments (characteristically deontological) are driven by automatic emotional responses. The authors manipulate cognitive load to selectively interfere with utilitarian judgments, finding that increasing cognitive load increases response time (RT) for utilitarian judgments but not for non-utilitarian judgments. This selective interference provides direct evidence for the influence of controlled cognitive processes in moral judgment, specifically in utilitarian judgments. The results support the hypothesis that utilitarian judgments are more resistant to cognitive load than non-utilitarian judgments, suggesting that controlled cognitive processes play a crucial role in ex ante moral judgment.