COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL NORMS

COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL NORMS

10/14/99 | Elinor Ostrom
Elinor Ostrom's paper discusses the evolution of social norms and collective action, challenging the traditional view that rational, self-interested individuals will not act in their common interest. She highlights the work of Mancur Olson, who argued that no one would contribute to public goods, but empirical research has shown that many people do contribute to voluntary associations and natural resource governance. Ostrom emphasizes the importance of contextual variables, such as group size, heterogeneity, and the presence of social norms, in overcoming social dilemmas. She proposes an indirect evolutionary approach to explain how multiple types of players—rational egoists and those who use social norms—can survive and thrive in social dilemma situations. This approach considers how players' preferences evolve based on intrinsic rewards and punishments associated with social norms, and how these preferences influence their behavior in collective-action settings. Ostrom's work integrates micro-theory with empirical findings, providing a more comprehensive understanding of collective action and social norms.Elinor Ostrom's paper discusses the evolution of social norms and collective action, challenging the traditional view that rational, self-interested individuals will not act in their common interest. She highlights the work of Mancur Olson, who argued that no one would contribute to public goods, but empirical research has shown that many people do contribute to voluntary associations and natural resource governance. Ostrom emphasizes the importance of contextual variables, such as group size, heterogeneity, and the presence of social norms, in overcoming social dilemmas. She proposes an indirect evolutionary approach to explain how multiple types of players—rational egoists and those who use social norms—can survive and thrive in social dilemma situations. This approach considers how players' preferences evolve based on intrinsic rewards and punishments associated with social norms, and how these preferences influence their behavior in collective-action settings. Ostrom's work integrates micro-theory with empirical findings, providing a more comprehensive understanding of collective action and social norms.
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