This paper examines the role of mission preferences in shaping organizational efficiency and incentives, focusing on mission-oriented organizations such as schools, hospitals, and non-profits. It argues that matching principals and agents with similar mission preferences can enhance productivity by reducing the need for high-powered incentives. However, it also highlights the potential for bureaucratic conservatism and resistance to innovation. The paper applies these insights to various sectors, including education, public services, and non-profits, and discusses the interplay between incentives and productivity across different sectors. It emphasizes the importance of mission alignment in improving organizational efficiency and the role of competition in sorting agents and principals based on mission preferences. The paper also addresses the implications of different financing regimes for mission-oriented organizations, suggesting that diverse mission preferences can lead to more efficient outcomes. The analysis is grounded in a model of principal-agent relationships, where agents are motivated by non-pecuniary benefits and principals aim to maximize productivity through optimal contracts and matching. The paper concludes that competition and mission alignment can enhance productivity and efficiency in mission-oriented sectors, while also highlighting the challenges of maintaining motivation in public bureaucracies.This paper examines the role of mission preferences in shaping organizational efficiency and incentives, focusing on mission-oriented organizations such as schools, hospitals, and non-profits. It argues that matching principals and agents with similar mission preferences can enhance productivity by reducing the need for high-powered incentives. However, it also highlights the potential for bureaucratic conservatism and resistance to innovation. The paper applies these insights to various sectors, including education, public services, and non-profits, and discusses the interplay between incentives and productivity across different sectors. It emphasizes the importance of mission alignment in improving organizational efficiency and the role of competition in sorting agents and principals based on mission preferences. The paper also addresses the implications of different financing regimes for mission-oriented organizations, suggesting that diverse mission preferences can lead to more efficient outcomes. The analysis is grounded in a model of principal-agent relationships, where agents are motivated by non-pecuniary benefits and principals aim to maximize productivity through optimal contracts and matching. The paper concludes that competition and mission alignment can enhance productivity and efficiency in mission-oriented sectors, while also highlighting the challenges of maintaining motivation in public bureaucracies.