The authors propose a taxonomy of conscious, preconscious, and subliminal processing, based on the global neuronal workspace hypothesis. They argue that conscious perception is associated with surges of parieto-frontal activity, which cause top-down amplification. They distinguish between subliminal processing, which is below the threshold for conscious access, preconscious processing, which is potentially accessible but not consciously accessed, and conscious processing, which involves access to conscious report. They suggest that these distinctions map onto different neural mechanisms. They also argue that attention is not a confound but a necessary condition for conscious access. They propose that preconscious processing is a state of temporary buffering of information due to a lack of top-down attentional amplification. They suggest that the distinction between these states can help explain conflicting neuroimaging results. They also discuss the implications of their taxonomy for understanding the neural basis of consciousness and the role of attention in conscious processing. The authors conclude that their taxonomy provides a framework for understanding the neural mechanisms of consciousness and the role of attention in conscious processing.The authors propose a taxonomy of conscious, preconscious, and subliminal processing, based on the global neuronal workspace hypothesis. They argue that conscious perception is associated with surges of parieto-frontal activity, which cause top-down amplification. They distinguish between subliminal processing, which is below the threshold for conscious access, preconscious processing, which is potentially accessible but not consciously accessed, and conscious processing, which involves access to conscious report. They suggest that these distinctions map onto different neural mechanisms. They also argue that attention is not a confound but a necessary condition for conscious access. They propose that preconscious processing is a state of temporary buffering of information due to a lack of top-down attentional amplification. They suggest that the distinction between these states can help explain conflicting neuroimaging results. They also discuss the implications of their taxonomy for understanding the neural basis of consciousness and the role of attention in conscious processing. The authors conclude that their taxonomy provides a framework for understanding the neural mechanisms of consciousness and the role of attention in conscious processing.