The book "Consciousness, Color, and Content" is a further development of the author's earlier theory of phenomenal consciousness, known as representationalism. It addresses key challenges to reductionist theories of consciousness, such as the explanatory gap and the knowledge argument. The author argues that the concepts used to describe phenomenal experiences—phenomenal concepts—are conceptually irreducible, and that questions about the explanatory gap are not genuine questions. The book is divided into three parts. Part I focuses on the explanatory gap and the knowledge argument, presenting a theory of phenomenal concepts. Part II explores representationalism, including the development of the "transparency intuition" and responses to counter-examples, such as the Inverted Earth and Swampman cases. Part III addresses broader issues, including the nature of color. The author defends a commonsense view of color, arguing that it is compatible with representationalism and that modern science does not necessarily contradict it. The book aims to show that representationalism can account for color and other secondary qualities, and that commonsense understanding of color is valid. The author also argues that representationalism can help resolve the issue of the phylogenetic dividing line between phenomenally conscious and non-conscious creatures. Overall, the book presents a comprehensive defense of representationalism and its implications for understanding consciousness, color, and the nature of mental states.The book "Consciousness, Color, and Content" is a further development of the author's earlier theory of phenomenal consciousness, known as representationalism. It addresses key challenges to reductionist theories of consciousness, such as the explanatory gap and the knowledge argument. The author argues that the concepts used to describe phenomenal experiences—phenomenal concepts—are conceptually irreducible, and that questions about the explanatory gap are not genuine questions. The book is divided into three parts. Part I focuses on the explanatory gap and the knowledge argument, presenting a theory of phenomenal concepts. Part II explores representationalism, including the development of the "transparency intuition" and responses to counter-examples, such as the Inverted Earth and Swampman cases. Part III addresses broader issues, including the nature of color. The author defends a commonsense view of color, arguing that it is compatible with representationalism and that modern science does not necessarily contradict it. The book aims to show that representationalism can account for color and other secondary qualities, and that commonsense understanding of color is valid. The author also argues that representationalism can help resolve the issue of the phylogenetic dividing line between phenomenally conscious and non-conscious creatures. Overall, the book presents a comprehensive defense of representationalism and its implications for understanding consciousness, color, and the nature of mental states.