This paper examines the relationship between corporate governance, economic entrenchment, and economic growth. It argues that the concentration of corporate control in the hands of wealthy families can lead to inefficiencies in resource allocation and slower economic growth. The paper highlights the use of control pyramids, cross-shareholdings, and super voting rights by wealthy families to control large corporations without significant capital investment. These structures allow families to exert control over a large portion of a country's economy, leading to economic entrenchment, where these families have disproportionate political influence relative to their actual wealth. The paper also discusses the role of institutional development in maintaining economic entrenchment and identifies key determinants of this phenomenon. It concludes that while control pyramids can be beneficial in some contexts, they often lead to inefficiencies and hinder economic growth. The paper emphasizes the need for further research on the political economy implications of corporate control distribution.This paper examines the relationship between corporate governance, economic entrenchment, and economic growth. It argues that the concentration of corporate control in the hands of wealthy families can lead to inefficiencies in resource allocation and slower economic growth. The paper highlights the use of control pyramids, cross-shareholdings, and super voting rights by wealthy families to control large corporations without significant capital investment. These structures allow families to exert control over a large portion of a country's economy, leading to economic entrenchment, where these families have disproportionate political influence relative to their actual wealth. The paper also discusses the role of institutional development in maintaining economic entrenchment and identifies key determinants of this phenomenon. It concludes that while control pyramids can be beneficial in some contexts, they often lead to inefficiencies and hinder economic growth. The paper emphasizes the need for further research on the political economy implications of corporate control distribution.