The paper by Randall Morck, Daniel Wolfenzon, and Bernard Yeung explores the relationship between corporate governance, economic entrenchment, and growth. They argue that in many countries, large corporations are controlled by wealthy families who use pyramidal control structures, cross-shareholdings, and super-voting rights to exert significant control without making substantial capital investments. This results in agency and entrenchment problems, poor resource utilization, and distorted capital allocation, leading to slower economic growth. The authors also highlight that controlling shareholders can influence political influence and policy development, further entrenching their control. They identify key determinants of economic entrenchment and suggest that further research is needed to understand the political economy of corporate control. The paper concludes by discussing the potential benefits of control pyramids and the need for more empirical work to verify these findings.The paper by Randall Morck, Daniel Wolfenzon, and Bernard Yeung explores the relationship between corporate governance, economic entrenchment, and growth. They argue that in many countries, large corporations are controlled by wealthy families who use pyramidal control structures, cross-shareholdings, and super-voting rights to exert significant control without making substantial capital investments. This results in agency and entrenchment problems, poor resource utilization, and distorted capital allocation, leading to slower economic growth. The authors also highlight that controlling shareholders can influence political influence and policy development, further entrenching their control. They identify key determinants of economic entrenchment and suggest that further research is needed to understand the political economy of corporate control. The paper concludes by discussing the potential benefits of control pyramids and the need for more empirical work to verify these findings.