The paper "Corporate Ownership Around the World" by Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer examines the ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies. The authors aim to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms and compare the findings with the traditional image of the modern corporation, as described by Berle and Means, which suggests that large corporations are widely-held and managed by professional managers unaccountable to shareholders. Key findings include: 1. **Widely-Held Firms**: Only about a third of the largest firms in rich countries are widely-held, suggesting that the Berle and Means image is misleading. 2. **Controlling Shareholders**: In most cases, controlling shareholders are either families or the state, rather than financial institutions or other widely-held corporations. 3. **Power Dynamics**: Controlling shareholders typically have significant control over firms, often through the use of pyramids and participation in management, rather than through superior cash flow rights. 4. **Country Differences**: The prevalence of widely-held firms is higher in countries with better shareholder protection, indicating that good legal protection enables controlling shareholders to divest at attractive prices. 5. **Medium-Sized Firms**: Among medium-sized firms, the incidence of widely-held ownership is even lower, and family control becomes the dominant pattern, especially in countries with poor shareholder protection. The study provides a comprehensive description of ownership patterns in large firms across different countries, challenging the traditional view of the modern corporation and highlighting the importance of controlling shareholders' incentives and capabilities in corporate governance.The paper "Corporate Ownership Around the World" by Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer examines the ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies. The authors aim to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms and compare the findings with the traditional image of the modern corporation, as described by Berle and Means, which suggests that large corporations are widely-held and managed by professional managers unaccountable to shareholders. Key findings include: 1. **Widely-Held Firms**: Only about a third of the largest firms in rich countries are widely-held, suggesting that the Berle and Means image is misleading. 2. **Controlling Shareholders**: In most cases, controlling shareholders are either families or the state, rather than financial institutions or other widely-held corporations. 3. **Power Dynamics**: Controlling shareholders typically have significant control over firms, often through the use of pyramids and participation in management, rather than through superior cash flow rights. 4. **Country Differences**: The prevalence of widely-held firms is higher in countries with better shareholder protection, indicating that good legal protection enables controlling shareholders to divest at attractive prices. 5. **Medium-Sized Firms**: Among medium-sized firms, the incidence of widely-held ownership is even lower, and family control becomes the dominant pattern, especially in countries with poor shareholder protection. The study provides a comprehensive description of ownership patterns in large firms across different countries, challenging the traditional view of the modern corporation and highlighting the importance of controlling shareholders' incentives and capabilities in corporate governance.