La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) analyze corporate ownership structures in 27 wealthy economies, identifying ultimate controlling shareholders. They find that in most economies, large corporations are not widely held but are instead controlled by families or the state. Financial institutions and other widely held corporations rarely control firms. Controlling shareholders often have significant power over firms, exceeding their cash flow rights through pyramids and management participation. The study suggests that the main agency problem in large corporations is the restriction of expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders, not the restriction of managerial empire building. The research highlights that in countries with strong shareholder protection, minority shareholders are more willing to pay higher prices for shares, leading to more equity financing and reduced ownership stakes for controlling shareholders. The study also finds that in countries with poor shareholder protection, controlling shareholders are more likely to use pyramids and differential voting rights to maintain control. The paper concludes that the Berle and Means image of widely held corporations is not universal and that the ownership patterns of large firms vary significantly across countries. The study provides a comparative analysis of corporate ownership structures, emphasizing the role of legal protections in shaping ownership and control.La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) analyze corporate ownership structures in 27 wealthy economies, identifying ultimate controlling shareholders. They find that in most economies, large corporations are not widely held but are instead controlled by families or the state. Financial institutions and other widely held corporations rarely control firms. Controlling shareholders often have significant power over firms, exceeding their cash flow rights through pyramids and management participation. The study suggests that the main agency problem in large corporations is the restriction of expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders, not the restriction of managerial empire building. The research highlights that in countries with strong shareholder protection, minority shareholders are more willing to pay higher prices for shares, leading to more equity financing and reduced ownership stakes for controlling shareholders. The study also finds that in countries with poor shareholder protection, controlling shareholders are more likely to use pyramids and differential voting rights to maintain control. The paper concludes that the Berle and Means image of widely held corporations is not universal and that the ownership patterns of large firms vary significantly across countries. The study provides a comparative analysis of corporate ownership structures, emphasizing the role of legal protections in shaping ownership and control.