Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? Oona A. Hathaway This article examines whether human rights treaties are effective in changing state behavior. It presents a large-scale quantitative analysis of the relationship between human rights treaties and countries' human rights practices. The analysis uses data from 166 nations over nearly forty years in five areas of human rights law: genocide, torture, fair and public trials, civil liberties, and political representation of women. The study investigates two questions: first, whether countries comply with the requirements of the human rights treaties they have joined; and second, whether these treaties appear to be effective in improving countries' human rights practices. The article challenges the assumption that international law, including human rights law, is generally effective in changing state behavior. It argues that human rights treaties may not always lead to better human rights practices, as compliance with treaty obligations is common and sometimes associated with worse human rights ratings. However, the study also finds that ratification of human rights treaties by fully democratic nations is associated with better human rights practices. The article discusses existing theories on treaty compliance and effectiveness, dividing them into two broad camps: rational actor models and normative theory. Rational actor models suggest that states act in their self-interest and that compliance with international law is a result of self-interest. Normative models, on the other hand, argue that the persuasive power of legitimate legal obligations plays a significant role in state behavior. The article also explores the dual nature of human rights treaties as both instrumental and expressive instruments. Treaties are instrumental in that they create law that binds ratifying countries, with the goal of modifying nations' practices in particular ways. However, treaties also declare or express the position of countries that have ratified them. The position taken by countries in such instances can be sincere, but it need not be. When countries are rewarded for positions rather than effects—as they are when monitoring and enforcement of treaties are minimal—governments can take positions that they do not honor, and benefit from doing so. The article concludes that human rights treaties may have favorable effects on human rights across the board, even if they do not always lead to better human rights practices within the countries that ratify them. The findings suggest that treaties may have positive effects on ratifying countries over the long term, creating public commitments that can be used to push nations to make gradual, if grudging, improvements.Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? Oona A. Hathaway This article examines whether human rights treaties are effective in changing state behavior. It presents a large-scale quantitative analysis of the relationship between human rights treaties and countries' human rights practices. The analysis uses data from 166 nations over nearly forty years in five areas of human rights law: genocide, torture, fair and public trials, civil liberties, and political representation of women. The study investigates two questions: first, whether countries comply with the requirements of the human rights treaties they have joined; and second, whether these treaties appear to be effective in improving countries' human rights practices. The article challenges the assumption that international law, including human rights law, is generally effective in changing state behavior. It argues that human rights treaties may not always lead to better human rights practices, as compliance with treaty obligations is common and sometimes associated with worse human rights ratings. However, the study also finds that ratification of human rights treaties by fully democratic nations is associated with better human rights practices. The article discusses existing theories on treaty compliance and effectiveness, dividing them into two broad camps: rational actor models and normative theory. Rational actor models suggest that states act in their self-interest and that compliance with international law is a result of self-interest. Normative models, on the other hand, argue that the persuasive power of legitimate legal obligations plays a significant role in state behavior. The article also explores the dual nature of human rights treaties as both instrumental and expressive instruments. Treaties are instrumental in that they create law that binds ratifying countries, with the goal of modifying nations' practices in particular ways. However, treaties also declare or express the position of countries that have ratified them. The position taken by countries in such instances can be sincere, but it need not be. When countries are rewarded for positions rather than effects—as they are when monitoring and enforcement of treaties are minimal—governments can take positions that they do not honor, and benefit from doing so. The article concludes that human rights treaties may have favorable effects on human rights across the board, even if they do not always lead to better human rights practices within the countries that ratify them. The findings suggest that treaties may have positive effects on ratifying countries over the long term, creating public commitments that can be used to push nations to make gradual, if grudging, improvements.