The article by Oona A. Hathaway explores the effectiveness of human rights treaties in shaping state behavior and improving human rights practices. It reviews existing literature on treaty compliance and effectiveness, dividing it into two broad camps: rational actor models and normative theory. Rational actor models, including realism, institutionalism, and liberalism, suggest that compliance is driven by self-interest or strategic considerations. Normative theory, on the other hand, posits that compliance is due to the persuasive power of norms and the internalization of these norms. Hathaway's analysis uses a large-scale quantitative study of 166 nations over nearly four decades, focusing on five areas of human rights law: genocide, torture, fair and public trials, civil liberties, and women's political representation. The study examines whether countries comply with the requirements of human rights treaties and whether these treaties improve human rights practices. The article finds that while countries with ratified treaties generally have better human rights practices, noncompliance is common. Paradoxically, when controlling for other factors, treaty ratification is sometimes associated with worse human rights ratings. However, ratification by fully democratic nations is linked to better human rights practices. Hathaway argues that this paradox can be explained by the dual nature of human rights treaties: they are both instrumental (binding on ratifying states) and expressive (declare a country's position to the international community). The article concludes by discussing the potential positive effects of human rights treaties that may be overlooked by quantitative analysis and suggests ways to align the expressive and instrumental roles of treaties to enhance their effectiveness in improving human lives.The article by Oona A. Hathaway explores the effectiveness of human rights treaties in shaping state behavior and improving human rights practices. It reviews existing literature on treaty compliance and effectiveness, dividing it into two broad camps: rational actor models and normative theory. Rational actor models, including realism, institutionalism, and liberalism, suggest that compliance is driven by self-interest or strategic considerations. Normative theory, on the other hand, posits that compliance is due to the persuasive power of norms and the internalization of these norms. Hathaway's analysis uses a large-scale quantitative study of 166 nations over nearly four decades, focusing on five areas of human rights law: genocide, torture, fair and public trials, civil liberties, and women's political representation. The study examines whether countries comply with the requirements of human rights treaties and whether these treaties improve human rights practices. The article finds that while countries with ratified treaties generally have better human rights practices, noncompliance is common. Paradoxically, when controlling for other factors, treaty ratification is sometimes associated with worse human rights ratings. However, ratification by fully democratic nations is linked to better human rights practices. Hathaway argues that this paradox can be explained by the dual nature of human rights treaties: they are both instrumental (binding on ratifying states) and expressive (declare a country's position to the international community). The article concludes by discussing the potential positive effects of human rights treaties that may be overlooked by quantitative analysis and suggests ways to align the expressive and instrumental roles of treaties to enhance their effectiveness in improving human lives.