This paper presents an efficient multiparty protocol for securely computing a function F using circuit randomization. The protocol reduces the number of communication rounds and simplifies the process of secret sharing and multiplication. The key idea is to randomize all inputs and outputs of the circuit, then perform corrections to compute the correct values without requiring traditional secret multiplication. This approach significantly reduces the number of rounds needed, as it replaces complex secret multiplication steps with simple secret reconstruction. The protocol uses broadcast messages instead of Byzantine Agreement, making it more efficient and easier to implement. The main results show that the protocol requires only S + M + D_F rounds, where S is the number of rounds for secret sharing, M for multiplication, and D_F is the depth of the circuit. This is a significant improvement over previous protocols, which required S + D_F*M + 1 rounds. The protocol is efficient, secure, and compatible with other techniques for reducing rounds. It also reduces the message complexity by avoiding the need to generate random secrets for all gates, only for multiplicative gates. The protocol is proven to be t-resilient against Byzantine adversaries, and it can be applied to any protocol based on circuit evaluation, including cryptographic multiparty protocols. The paper also discusses the practical advantages of the protocol, including its simplicity and efficiency in implementation.This paper presents an efficient multiparty protocol for securely computing a function F using circuit randomization. The protocol reduces the number of communication rounds and simplifies the process of secret sharing and multiplication. The key idea is to randomize all inputs and outputs of the circuit, then perform corrections to compute the correct values without requiring traditional secret multiplication. This approach significantly reduces the number of rounds needed, as it replaces complex secret multiplication steps with simple secret reconstruction. The protocol uses broadcast messages instead of Byzantine Agreement, making it more efficient and easier to implement. The main results show that the protocol requires only S + M + D_F rounds, where S is the number of rounds for secret sharing, M for multiplication, and D_F is the depth of the circuit. This is a significant improvement over previous protocols, which required S + D_F*M + 1 rounds. The protocol is efficient, secure, and compatible with other techniques for reducing rounds. It also reduces the message complexity by avoiding the need to generate random secrets for all gates, only for multiplicative gates. The protocol is proven to be t-resilient against Byzantine adversaries, and it can be applied to any protocol based on circuit evaluation, including cryptographic multiparty protocols. The paper also discusses the practical advantages of the protocol, including its simplicity and efficiency in implementation.