ISSN 1699 – 3950 The autonomous power of the state: its origins, mechanisms and results Michael Mann This essay seeks to specify the origins, mechanisms and results of the autonomous power that the state possesses in relation to the main power groups in "civil society." The argument is presented generally, but is derived from my Sources of social power, a major empirical research project on the development of power in human societies. At present, my generalizations are more bold in the case of agrarian societies; in the case of industrial societies, I will be more hesitant. I define the state and then seek the implications of this definition. I discuss two essential parts of the definition, centralization and territoriality, in relation to two types of state power, called here despotic and infrastructural. I argue that the state's autonomy, in both despotic and infrastructural forms, mainly proceeds from the specific capacity of the state to provide a form of territorially centralized organization. Today, there is no need to reconsider that most general theories of the state have been wrong because they have been reductionist. They have reduced the state to pre-existing structures of civil society. This is clearly true of the Marxist, liberal and functionalist traditions of state theory, each of which has primarily viewed the state as a space, a arena, in which class struggles, interest groups and individuals express and institutionalize themselves, and—in the functionalist versions—where the general will (or, using more modern terms, essential values or normative consensus) is expressed and fulfilled. Although these theories differ in many things, they all agree in denying significant autonomous power to the state. However, despite excellent criticisms of this reductionism and despite the implicit self-criticism in the constant use of the term "relative autonomy" by recent Marxists, there has still been a curious resistance to analyzing this autonomy. A major obstacle has been political. The main alternative theory that seems to defend state autonomy has been associated with a rather unattractive politics. I refer to the militaryist tradition of state theory embodied in the works of writers predominantly of Germanic origin such as Gumplowicz, Ratzenhofer and Schmitt. They conceived the state as a physical force, and since this was the first motor of society, the military state was thus superior to the economic and ideological structures identified by reductionist theories. However, the scientific merits of these theories were quickly drowned by their political associations: with social Darwinism, racism, glorification of state power, and later fascism. The (deeply ironic) result was that the military theory was defeated in the battlefield by the combined forces of Russia (Marxist) and the (liberal democratic and functionalist) Western allies. We have not heard directly from it since then. However, its indirect influence has been felt, especially in recent times, through the work of "good Germans" such as Weber, HintISSN 1699 – 3950 The autonomous power of the state: its origins, mechanisms and results Michael Mann This essay seeks to specify the origins, mechanisms and results of the autonomous power that the state possesses in relation to the main power groups in "civil society." The argument is presented generally, but is derived from my Sources of social power, a major empirical research project on the development of power in human societies. At present, my generalizations are more bold in the case of agrarian societies; in the case of industrial societies, I will be more hesitant. I define the state and then seek the implications of this definition. I discuss two essential parts of the definition, centralization and territoriality, in relation to two types of state power, called here despotic and infrastructural. I argue that the state's autonomy, in both despotic and infrastructural forms, mainly proceeds from the specific capacity of the state to provide a form of territorially centralized organization. Today, there is no need to reconsider that most general theories of the state have been wrong because they have been reductionist. They have reduced the state to pre-existing structures of civil society. This is clearly true of the Marxist, liberal and functionalist traditions of state theory, each of which has primarily viewed the state as a space, a arena, in which class struggles, interest groups and individuals express and institutionalize themselves, and—in the functionalist versions—where the general will (or, using more modern terms, essential values or normative consensus) is expressed and fulfilled. Although these theories differ in many things, they all agree in denying significant autonomous power to the state. However, despite excellent criticisms of this reductionism and despite the implicit self-criticism in the constant use of the term "relative autonomy" by recent Marxists, there has still been a curious resistance to analyzing this autonomy. A major obstacle has been political. The main alternative theory that seems to defend state autonomy has been associated with a rather unattractive politics. I refer to the militaryist tradition of state theory embodied in the works of writers predominantly of Germanic origin such as Gumplowicz, Ratzenhofer and Schmitt. They conceived the state as a physical force, and since this was the first motor of society, the military state was thus superior to the economic and ideological structures identified by reductionist theories. However, the scientific merits of these theories were quickly drowned by their political associations: with social Darwinism, racism, glorification of state power, and later fascism. The (deeply ironic) result was that the military theory was defeated in the battlefield by the combined forces of Russia (Marxist) and the (liberal democratic and functionalist) Western allies. We have not heard directly from it since then. However, its indirect influence has been felt, especially in recent times, through the work of "good Germans" such as Weber, Hint