The past 20 years have seen an explosion of research and theory on emotions in protest and social movements. At one extreme, general theoretical statements about emotions have established their importance in every aspect of political action. At the other, the origins and influence of many specific emotions have been isolated as causal mechanisms. This article offers something in between, a typology of emotional processes aimed not only at showing that not all emotions work the same way, but also at encouraging research into how different emotions interact with one another. This should also help us overcome a residual suspicion that emotions are irrational, as well as avoid the overreaction, namely demonstrations that emotions help (and never hurt) protest mobilization and goals. Emotions are present in all phases and aspects of protest, motivating individuals, generating in crowds, expressing rhetorically, and shaping the manifest and latent objectives of movements. Emotions can be means, also ends, and sometimes both; they can facilitate or hinder mobilization efforts, strategies, and the success of movements. Cooperation and collective action have always offered the opportunity to think about social action in a more integral way; the return of emotions is the last source of inspiration for this. Over the past two decades, the intellectual pendulum has swung from structural theories to cultural theories of social movements. These include motivation for action, the sense of events for political participants, strategic dilemmas and decision-making processes, and the need for a theory of action that complements the structural theory developed in the 70s and 80s. Almost all cultural models and concepts used today (e.g., frames, identities, narratives) would be poorly framed if they did not admit explicit emotional causal mechanisms. However, few of them actually do. The emerging sub-field of emotions in movements has been restricted by several conceptual confusions reflected in the broader social sciences of emotions. The first problem lies in the persistence of the traditional but unsustainable contrast between emotions and rationality in the form of other dualisms, such as body and mind, individual and social, or affect and emotion. It is necessary to recognize that feeling and thinking are parallel processes of evaluation and interaction with our worlds, formed by similar neurological structures. Perhaps as a reaction to these residual dualisms, scholars in this sub-field often only focus on emotions that collaborate with protesters rather than studying those that help, harm, or do not interfere (similarly with other concepts such as resources or opportunities, which are often portrayed only as positive aspects). The second problem refers to the terms used for certain emotions, which are often taken from natural language in an intact form—such as anger and fear—although they actually refer to different classes of feelings. Anger, for example, can suggest a visceral wave of panic over something hidden, or a refined indignation about the insensitivity of our government. Shame, on the other hand, has at least two different forms: one (also seen in non-human beings) is based on physical humiliationThe past 20 years have seen an explosion of research and theory on emotions in protest and social movements. At one extreme, general theoretical statements about emotions have established their importance in every aspect of political action. At the other, the origins and influence of many specific emotions have been isolated as causal mechanisms. This article offers something in between, a typology of emotional processes aimed not only at showing that not all emotions work the same way, but also at encouraging research into how different emotions interact with one another. This should also help us overcome a residual suspicion that emotions are irrational, as well as avoid the overreaction, namely demonstrations that emotions help (and never hurt) protest mobilization and goals. Emotions are present in all phases and aspects of protest, motivating individuals, generating in crowds, expressing rhetorically, and shaping the manifest and latent objectives of movements. Emotions can be means, also ends, and sometimes both; they can facilitate or hinder mobilization efforts, strategies, and the success of movements. Cooperation and collective action have always offered the opportunity to think about social action in a more integral way; the return of emotions is the last source of inspiration for this. Over the past two decades, the intellectual pendulum has swung from structural theories to cultural theories of social movements. These include motivation for action, the sense of events for political participants, strategic dilemmas and decision-making processes, and the need for a theory of action that complements the structural theory developed in the 70s and 80s. Almost all cultural models and concepts used today (e.g., frames, identities, narratives) would be poorly framed if they did not admit explicit emotional causal mechanisms. However, few of them actually do. The emerging sub-field of emotions in movements has been restricted by several conceptual confusions reflected in the broader social sciences of emotions. The first problem lies in the persistence of the traditional but unsustainable contrast between emotions and rationality in the form of other dualisms, such as body and mind, individual and social, or affect and emotion. It is necessary to recognize that feeling and thinking are parallel processes of evaluation and interaction with our worlds, formed by similar neurological structures. Perhaps as a reaction to these residual dualisms, scholars in this sub-field often only focus on emotions that collaborate with protesters rather than studying those that help, harm, or do not interfere (similarly with other concepts such as resources or opportunities, which are often portrayed only as positive aspects). The second problem refers to the terms used for certain emotions, which are often taken from natural language in an intact form—such as anger and fear—although they actually refer to different classes of feelings. Anger, for example, can suggest a visceral wave of panic over something hidden, or a refined indignation about the insensitivity of our government. Shame, on the other hand, has at least two different forms: one (also seen in non-human beings) is based on physical humiliation