This paper analyzes the role of export subsidies in international trade policy, focusing on how they can be attractive from a domestic perspective. The authors argue that export subsidies can help domestic firms gain a larger market share in international markets, especially in the presence of imperfect competition. They present a model where two firms, one domestic and one foreign, compete in a Cournot duopoly. The domestic firm can benefit from export subsidies, which lower its marginal cost and increase its market share. However, these subsidies are jointly suboptimal for the two countries. The paper also discusses the effects of export subsidies on terms of trade and domestic welfare. While export subsidies may worsen the terms of trade for the subsidizing country, they can still increase domestic welfare due to the higher prices in imperfectly competitive markets. The authors show that in a noncooperative equilibrium, both exporting countries may choose to subsidize exports, leading to a Nash equilibrium in subsidy levels. The analysis is extended to include the importing country, where the optimal tariff or subsidy can be determined. The paper concludes that export subsidies can be attractive policies for domestic firms, even though they are jointly suboptimal. The results suggest that international regulations aimed at discouraging subsidies may need to be reinforced regularly to be effective. The paper highlights the importance of imperfect competition in international trade policy and the strategic advantages that export subsidies can provide to domestic firms.This paper analyzes the role of export subsidies in international trade policy, focusing on how they can be attractive from a domestic perspective. The authors argue that export subsidies can help domestic firms gain a larger market share in international markets, especially in the presence of imperfect competition. They present a model where two firms, one domestic and one foreign, compete in a Cournot duopoly. The domestic firm can benefit from export subsidies, which lower its marginal cost and increase its market share. However, these subsidies are jointly suboptimal for the two countries. The paper also discusses the effects of export subsidies on terms of trade and domestic welfare. While export subsidies may worsen the terms of trade for the subsidizing country, they can still increase domestic welfare due to the higher prices in imperfectly competitive markets. The authors show that in a noncooperative equilibrium, both exporting countries may choose to subsidize exports, leading to a Nash equilibrium in subsidy levels. The analysis is extended to include the importing country, where the optimal tariff or subsidy can be determined. The paper concludes that export subsidies can be attractive policies for domestic firms, even though they are jointly suboptimal. The results suggest that international regulations aimed at discouraging subsidies may need to be reinforced regularly to be effective. The paper highlights the importance of imperfect competition in international trade policy and the strategic advantages that export subsidies can provide to domestic firms.