The article discusses the concept of minimal phenomenal selfhood (MPS), which refers to the simplest form of self-consciousness. It argues that while research on body perception and self-consciousness has made progress, the global and unitary nature of self-consciousness, the 'I' of experience and behavior, remains underexplored. MPS is defined as the conscious experience of being a self, characterized by global identification with the body, spatiotemporal self-location, and a first-person perspective (1PP). The article distinguishes between weak and strong 1PP, with weak 1PP being a geometrical feature of a perceptual model of reality, and strong 1PP involving the representation of the system as directed at an object component. The study reviews recent empirical evidence from neurology and cognitive science, highlighting the importance of MPS in understanding self-consciousness. It discusses how MPS can be manipulated through full-body illusions, which involve the sense of ownership and identification with the body as a whole. The article also explores abnormal MPS in neurological conditions such as out-of-body experiences, heautoscopy, and autoscopic hallucinations, which are associated with altered self-location and self-identification. The research emphasizes the importance of isolating the simplest form of self-consciousness to better understand the fundamental aspects of selfhood. It suggests that future research should focus on MPS, which is a phenomenological property, and that full-body illusions provide a new entry point for studying global and more fundamental aspects of self-consciousness. The article also discusses the neural mechanisms underlying partial ownership and self-identification, as well as the role of the vestibular system in global body representation. Overall, the study highlights the complexity of self-consciousness and the need for further research to understand the minimal conditions required for the appearance of a phenomenal self.The article discusses the concept of minimal phenomenal selfhood (MPS), which refers to the simplest form of self-consciousness. It argues that while research on body perception and self-consciousness has made progress, the global and unitary nature of self-consciousness, the 'I' of experience and behavior, remains underexplored. MPS is defined as the conscious experience of being a self, characterized by global identification with the body, spatiotemporal self-location, and a first-person perspective (1PP). The article distinguishes between weak and strong 1PP, with weak 1PP being a geometrical feature of a perceptual model of reality, and strong 1PP involving the representation of the system as directed at an object component. The study reviews recent empirical evidence from neurology and cognitive science, highlighting the importance of MPS in understanding self-consciousness. It discusses how MPS can be manipulated through full-body illusions, which involve the sense of ownership and identification with the body as a whole. The article also explores abnormal MPS in neurological conditions such as out-of-body experiences, heautoscopy, and autoscopic hallucinations, which are associated with altered self-location and self-identification. The research emphasizes the importance of isolating the simplest form of self-consciousness to better understand the fundamental aspects of selfhood. It suggests that future research should focus on MPS, which is a phenomenological property, and that full-body illusions provide a new entry point for studying global and more fundamental aspects of self-consciousness. The article also discusses the neural mechanisms underlying partial ownership and self-identification, as well as the role of the vestibular system in global body representation. Overall, the study highlights the complexity of self-consciousness and the need for further research to understand the minimal conditions required for the appearance of a phenomenal self.