The article by Blanke and Metzinger highlights recent research on body perception and self-consciousness, emphasizing the need to explore global aspects of bodily self-consciousness. They introduce the concept of "Minimal Phenomenal Selfhood" (MPS), which is a fundamental conscious experience of being someone. MPS is characterized by a globalized form of identification with the body as a whole, spatiotemporal self-location, and a first-person perspective (1PP). The authors argue that MPS is a necessary condition for the strong and cognitive 1PP but not for the weak 1PP. They discuss the neural mechanisms underlying MPS and how it can be manipulated experimentally using full-body illusions. The article also reviews neurological conditions that disrupt MPS, such as out-of-body experiences and autoscopic phenomena, and suggests that future research should focus on isolating the simplest form of self-consciousness.The article by Blanke and Metzinger highlights recent research on body perception and self-consciousness, emphasizing the need to explore global aspects of bodily self-consciousness. They introduce the concept of "Minimal Phenomenal Selfhood" (MPS), which is a fundamental conscious experience of being someone. MPS is characterized by a globalized form of identification with the body as a whole, spatiotemporal self-location, and a first-person perspective (1PP). The authors argue that MPS is a necessary condition for the strong and cognitive 1PP but not for the weak 1PP. They discuss the neural mechanisms underlying MPS and how it can be manipulated experimentally using full-body illusions. The article also reviews neurological conditions that disrupt MPS, such as out-of-body experiences and autoscopic phenomena, and suggests that future research should focus on isolating the simplest form of self-consciousness.