this book, "game theory" by roger b. myerson, provides a comprehensive analysis of conflict through the lens of game theory. it covers decision-theoretic foundations, basic models, equilibria of strategic-form games, sequential equilibria of extensive-form games, refinements of equilibrium in strategic form, games with communication, repeated games, bargaining and cooperation in two-person games, coalitions in cooperative games, and cooperation under uncertainty. the book begins with decision theory, exploring rationality, utility maximization, and Bayesian models. it then moves to basic game models, including extensive and strategic forms, and discusses equilibrium concepts such as nash equilibrium, sequential equilibria, and refinements like perfect and proper equilibria. the text also addresses games with incomplete information, correlated equilibria, and communication mechanisms. repeated games are analyzed, focusing on cooperation, discounting, and the role of initial doubt. bargaining and cooperation in two-person games are explored, including noncooperative foundations, bargaining solutions, and alternating-offer games. coalitions in cooperative games are discussed, covering characteristic functions, the core, shapley value, and other solution concepts. the final chapter examines cooperation under uncertainty, including efficiency, incentive-efficient mechanisms, and dynamic matching processes. the book is structured with chapters, sections, and exercises, providing a thorough understanding of game theory concepts and their applications in various contexts. it is a valuable resource for students and researchers in economics, political science, and related fields.this book, "game theory" by roger b. myerson, provides a comprehensive analysis of conflict through the lens of game theory. it covers decision-theoretic foundations, basic models, equilibria of strategic-form games, sequential equilibria of extensive-form games, refinements of equilibrium in strategic form, games with communication, repeated games, bargaining and cooperation in two-person games, coalitions in cooperative games, and cooperation under uncertainty. the book begins with decision theory, exploring rationality, utility maximization, and Bayesian models. it then moves to basic game models, including extensive and strategic forms, and discusses equilibrium concepts such as nash equilibrium, sequential equilibria, and refinements like perfect and proper equilibria. the text also addresses games with incomplete information, correlated equilibria, and communication mechanisms. repeated games are analyzed, focusing on cooperation, discounting, and the role of initial doubt. bargaining and cooperation in two-person games are explored, including noncooperative foundations, bargaining solutions, and alternating-offer games. coalitions in cooperative games are discussed, covering characteristic functions, the core, shapley value, and other solution concepts. the final chapter examines cooperation under uncertainty, including efficiency, incentive-efficient mechanisms, and dynamic matching processes. the book is structured with chapters, sections, and exercises, providing a thorough understanding of game theory concepts and their applications in various contexts. it is a valuable resource for students and researchers in economics, political science, and related fields.