Shelley J. Correll, Stephen Benard, and In Paik of Cornell University investigate whether mothers face a wage penalty in the labor market and whether this is due to status-based discrimination. Their study combines a laboratory experiment and an audit study of actual employers. In both studies, participants evaluated application materials for equally qualified job candidates who differed in parental status. The laboratory experiment found that mothers were penalized on measures of perceived competence and recommended starting salary, while men were not penalized and sometimes benefited from being parents. The audit study showed that actual employers discriminate against mothers but not fathers. Mothers experience additional workplace disadvantages beyond those associated with gender. Studies show that employed mothers in the U.S. face a per-child wage penalty of about 5%. Crittenden (2001) notes that the pay gap between mothers and nonmothers is larger than that between men and women for those under 35. Glass (2004) states that employed mothers now account for most of the "gender gap" in wages. The disadvantages are not limited to pay. Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick (2004) show that describing a consultant as a mother leads evaluators to rate her as less competent. Similarly, other studies show that visibly pregnant women are judged as less committed to their jobs, less dependable, and less authoritative, but warmer, more emotional, and more irrational than otherwise equal women. The authors propose that the "motherhood penalty" arises from cultural tensions between the motherhood role and the "ideal worker" role. They argue that evaluators, possibly unconsciously, expect mothers to be less competent and less committed to their jobs. This leads to subtle discrimination against mothers in hiring, promotion, and salary decisions. Fathers are not expected to face similar disadvantages because cultural understandings of fatherhood are not seen as incompatible with being a good worker. The authors conducted a laboratory experiment and an audit study to test these hypotheses. In the laboratory experiment, participants rated job applicants who differed in parental status. Mothers were rated as less competent, less committed, and less promotable than nonmothers. They were also offered lower starting salaries. In the audit study, actual employers discriminated against mothers but not fathers. The authors also review existing literature on the motherhood wage penalty and existing explanations for it. They argue that the wage penalty is partly due to status-based discrimination, where mothers are judged by a harsher standard than nonmothers. They propose that motherhood is a "status characteristic" that leads to biased evaluations of competence and commitment, and that this bias affects hiring, promotion, and salary decisions. The authors find that mothers are judged by a harsher standard than nonmothers, and that this bias is consistent with status characteristics theory. They also find that the wage penalty for mothers is mediated by evaluations of competence and commitment. The laboratory experiment allows them to isolate the mechanism of discrimination, while the auditShelley J. Correll, Stephen Benard, and In Paik of Cornell University investigate whether mothers face a wage penalty in the labor market and whether this is due to status-based discrimination. Their study combines a laboratory experiment and an audit study of actual employers. In both studies, participants evaluated application materials for equally qualified job candidates who differed in parental status. The laboratory experiment found that mothers were penalized on measures of perceived competence and recommended starting salary, while men were not penalized and sometimes benefited from being parents. The audit study showed that actual employers discriminate against mothers but not fathers. Mothers experience additional workplace disadvantages beyond those associated with gender. Studies show that employed mothers in the U.S. face a per-child wage penalty of about 5%. Crittenden (2001) notes that the pay gap between mothers and nonmothers is larger than that between men and women for those under 35. Glass (2004) states that employed mothers now account for most of the "gender gap" in wages. The disadvantages are not limited to pay. Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick (2004) show that describing a consultant as a mother leads evaluators to rate her as less competent. Similarly, other studies show that visibly pregnant women are judged as less committed to their jobs, less dependable, and less authoritative, but warmer, more emotional, and more irrational than otherwise equal women. The authors propose that the "motherhood penalty" arises from cultural tensions between the motherhood role and the "ideal worker" role. They argue that evaluators, possibly unconsciously, expect mothers to be less competent and less committed to their jobs. This leads to subtle discrimination against mothers in hiring, promotion, and salary decisions. Fathers are not expected to face similar disadvantages because cultural understandings of fatherhood are not seen as incompatible with being a good worker. The authors conducted a laboratory experiment and an audit study to test these hypotheses. In the laboratory experiment, participants rated job applicants who differed in parental status. Mothers were rated as less competent, less committed, and less promotable than nonmothers. They were also offered lower starting salaries. In the audit study, actual employers discriminated against mothers but not fathers. The authors also review existing literature on the motherhood wage penalty and existing explanations for it. They argue that the wage penalty is partly due to status-based discrimination, where mothers are judged by a harsher standard than nonmothers. They propose that motherhood is a "status characteristic" that leads to biased evaluations of competence and commitment, and that this bias affects hiring, promotion, and salary decisions. The authors find that mothers are judged by a harsher standard than nonmothers, and that this bias is consistent with status characteristics theory. They also find that the wage penalty for mothers is mediated by evaluations of competence and commitment. The laboratory experiment allows them to isolate the mechanism of discrimination, while the audit