The paper "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection" by Hans Carlsson and Eric van Damme explores the concept of global games, where players have incomplete information about the payoff structure of a game but know the general structure. The authors analyze how this uncertainty affects equilibrium selection in 2x2 games. They show that in such games, equilibrium play in a global game with vanishing noise forces players to conform to Harsanyi and Selten's risk dominance criterion. When the uncertainty is one-dimensional, this result can be obtained by repeated elimination of dominated strategies in the global game. The paper provides a formal definition of global games and proves that for 2x2 games, the risk dominant equilibrium is unique when the initial uncertainty about the game to be played is sufficiently large. The authors also discuss the implications of their findings and compare them with existing literature, highlighting the significance of their work in game theory.The paper "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection" by Hans Carlsson and Eric van Damme explores the concept of global games, where players have incomplete information about the payoff structure of a game but know the general structure. The authors analyze how this uncertainty affects equilibrium selection in 2x2 games. They show that in such games, equilibrium play in a global game with vanishing noise forces players to conform to Harsanyi and Selten's risk dominance criterion. When the uncertainty is one-dimensional, this result can be obtained by repeated elimination of dominated strategies in the global game. The paper provides a formal definition of global games and proves that for 2x2 games, the risk dominant equilibrium is unique when the initial uncertainty about the game to be played is sufficiently large. The authors also discuss the implications of their findings and compare them with existing literature, highlighting the significance of their work in game theory.