This paper examines the timing of CEO stock option awards to investigate whether corporate managers influence the terms of their own compensation. Using data from 620 stock option awards to CEOs of Fortune 500 companies between 1992 and 1994, the author finds that these awards coincide with favorable movements in company stock prices. The results suggest that CEOs receive stock options shortly before favorable corporate news, indicating that they may manipulate the timing of their awards to increase their wealth. The paper evaluates several alternative explanations, including insider trading and the manipulation of news announcement dates, and rejects them based on empirical evidence. The findings highlight the complex nature of executive compensation, where the role of stock options may be more about strategic timing than pure performance-based incentives.This paper examines the timing of CEO stock option awards to investigate whether corporate managers influence the terms of their own compensation. Using data from 620 stock option awards to CEOs of Fortune 500 companies between 1992 and 1994, the author finds that these awards coincide with favorable movements in company stock prices. The results suggest that CEOs receive stock options shortly before favorable corporate news, indicating that they may manipulate the timing of their awards to increase their wealth. The paper evaluates several alternative explanations, including insider trading and the manipulation of news announcement dates, and rejects them based on empirical evidence. The findings highlight the complex nature of executive compensation, where the role of stock options may be more about strategic timing than pure performance-based incentives.