In 1990, Elinor Ostrom published "Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action," a seminal work on the management of common pool resources (CPRs). The book challenges the traditional view that CPRs inevitably lead to the "tragedy of the commons," where overuse results from individual rationality. Ostrom argues that successful CPR management can be achieved through durable cooperative institutions designed and governed by the resource users themselves. Common pool resources are characterized by subtractability and shared use. Ostrom examines small-scale CPRs, excluding non-renewable resources and those with significant externalities. She identifies eight design principles for successful CPR management: clear boundaries, congruence between rules and local conditions, collective-choice arrangements, monitoring and enforcement, graduated sanctions, conflict resolution, recognition of user rights, and nested enterprises. Ostrom analyzes successful CPR systems in Switzerland, Japan, Spain, and the Philippines, highlighting how local institutions enable sustainable management. She also examines unsuccessful cases in Turkey, California, Sri Lanka, and Nova Scotia, noting the absence of the design principles that characterize successful systems. The book presents a framework for analyzing self-organizing CPR institutions, distinguishing it from models by emphasizing its role in generating hypotheses and theories. Ostrom's work is a major theoretical contribution to the study of collective action and institutional design, offering an inclusive framework that integrates insights from various social sciences. The book is essential for understanding CPR management institutions and provides a clear, critical analysis of existing approaches.In 1990, Elinor Ostrom published "Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action," a seminal work on the management of common pool resources (CPRs). The book challenges the traditional view that CPRs inevitably lead to the "tragedy of the commons," where overuse results from individual rationality. Ostrom argues that successful CPR management can be achieved through durable cooperative institutions designed and governed by the resource users themselves. Common pool resources are characterized by subtractability and shared use. Ostrom examines small-scale CPRs, excluding non-renewable resources and those with significant externalities. She identifies eight design principles for successful CPR management: clear boundaries, congruence between rules and local conditions, collective-choice arrangements, monitoring and enforcement, graduated sanctions, conflict resolution, recognition of user rights, and nested enterprises. Ostrom analyzes successful CPR systems in Switzerland, Japan, Spain, and the Philippines, highlighting how local institutions enable sustainable management. She also examines unsuccessful cases in Turkey, California, Sri Lanka, and Nova Scotia, noting the absence of the design principles that characterize successful systems. The book presents a framework for analyzing self-organizing CPR institutions, distinguishing it from models by emphasizing its role in generating hypotheses and theories. Ostrom's work is a major theoretical contribution to the study of collective action and institutional design, offering an inclusive framework that integrates insights from various social sciences. The book is essential for understanding CPR management institutions and provides a clear, critical analysis of existing approaches.