Elinor Ostrom's book *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action* (1990) is a significant contribution to the study of collective action and institutional design. The book addresses the challenges of managing common pool resources (CPRs), which are characterized by subtractability and joint use by multiple users. Ostrom challenges the common belief that CPRs inevitably lead to overuse and depletion, often referred to as the "tragedy of the commons." Instead, she advocates for the design of durable cooperative institutions that are organized and governed by the resource users themselves. Ostrom examines a range of small-scale CPRs, focusing on communities where users have strong incentives to manage resources sustainably due to economic dependence. She identifies eight design principles for successful CPR management, including clearly defined boundaries, congruence between rules and local conditions, collective-choice arrangements, monitoring compliance, graduated sanctions, conflict-resolution mechanisms, recognition of user rights, and nested enterprises. The book also explores the development of institutional change through incremental and sequential processes, using case studies from Switzerland, Japan, Spain, the Philippines, and Southern California. Ostrom's framework for analyzing self-organizing and self-governing CPRs is presented as a comprehensive system of variables, rules, and external constraints, providing a foundation for further theoretical development and empirical research. The book is praised for its clear language and empirical evidence, making it an essential resource for understanding CPR management institutions.Elinor Ostrom's book *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action* (1990) is a significant contribution to the study of collective action and institutional design. The book addresses the challenges of managing common pool resources (CPRs), which are characterized by subtractability and joint use by multiple users. Ostrom challenges the common belief that CPRs inevitably lead to overuse and depletion, often referred to as the "tragedy of the commons." Instead, she advocates for the design of durable cooperative institutions that are organized and governed by the resource users themselves. Ostrom examines a range of small-scale CPRs, focusing on communities where users have strong incentives to manage resources sustainably due to economic dependence. She identifies eight design principles for successful CPR management, including clearly defined boundaries, congruence between rules and local conditions, collective-choice arrangements, monitoring compliance, graduated sanctions, conflict-resolution mechanisms, recognition of user rights, and nested enterprises. The book also explores the development of institutional change through incremental and sequential processes, using case studies from Switzerland, Japan, Spain, the Philippines, and Southern California. Ostrom's framework for analyzing self-organizing and self-governing CPRs is presented as a comprehensive system of variables, rules, and external constraints, providing a foundation for further theoretical development and empirical research. The book is praised for its clear language and empirical evidence, making it an essential resource for understanding CPR management institutions.