The article by Arthur M. Glenberg and Michael P. Kaschak explores the phenomenon of the *action-sentence compatibility effect* (ACE) in language comprehension. The ACE refers to the finding that participants' ability to judge the sensibility of sentences is influenced by the implied direction of action in the sentence, which can interfere with their actual physical response. For example, when a sentence implies an action away from the body, participants find it difficult to respond in the opposite direction. This effect was observed for imperative sentences, sentences describing the transfer of concrete objects, and sentences describing the transfer of abstract entities. The authors argue that this phenomenon supports an embodied theory of meaning, where the meaning of sentences is grounded in human action. This contrasts with abstract symbol theories, which propose that language conveys meaning through the manipulation of abstract symbols. The study uses a button box to measure participants' response times and error rates, demonstrating that understanding a sentence can interfere with real-world actions. Experiments 2A and 2B replicate and extend the findings, showing that the ACE is robust and not specific to the dominant hand. The results suggest that the ACE is driven by action, rather than spatial location. The authors conclude that language understanding is deeply rooted in bodily action, and they discuss how this theory can be applied to other forms of language, such as causal language and scientific discourse.The article by Arthur M. Glenberg and Michael P. Kaschak explores the phenomenon of the *action-sentence compatibility effect* (ACE) in language comprehension. The ACE refers to the finding that participants' ability to judge the sensibility of sentences is influenced by the implied direction of action in the sentence, which can interfere with their actual physical response. For example, when a sentence implies an action away from the body, participants find it difficult to respond in the opposite direction. This effect was observed for imperative sentences, sentences describing the transfer of concrete objects, and sentences describing the transfer of abstract entities. The authors argue that this phenomenon supports an embodied theory of meaning, where the meaning of sentences is grounded in human action. This contrasts with abstract symbol theories, which propose that language conveys meaning through the manipulation of abstract symbols. The study uses a button box to measure participants' response times and error rates, demonstrating that understanding a sentence can interfere with real-world actions. Experiments 2A and 2B replicate and extend the findings, showing that the ACE is robust and not specific to the dominant hand. The results suggest that the ACE is driven by action, rather than spatial location. The authors conclude that language understanding is deeply rooted in bodily action, and they discuss how this theory can be applied to other forms of language, such as causal language and scientific discourse.