This paper examines how governments can influence media content and the implications for political accountability. It develops a model of democratic politics where media capture is endogenous, showing how media market features determine the government's ability to influence political outcomes. The model highlights that media pluralism protects against capture, as a large number of independent media organizations makes it less likely that the government can control news provision. Independent ownership also reduces capture, as the state's ability to transfer resources to the media is limited by transaction costs. Media capture negatively affects political outcomes by increasing corruption and reducing political turnover. The paper also shows that media capture can lead to a reduction in the quality of news, as media outlets may prioritize commercial interests over informative reporting. The model is tested against real-world data, showing that countries with higher levels of media capture tend to have higher levels of corruption. The paper concludes that media independence is crucial for democratic governance and that regulatory policies should aim to promote media pluralism and reduce the risk of government capture.This paper examines how governments can influence media content and the implications for political accountability. It develops a model of democratic politics where media capture is endogenous, showing how media market features determine the government's ability to influence political outcomes. The model highlights that media pluralism protects against capture, as a large number of independent media organizations makes it less likely that the government can control news provision. Independent ownership also reduces capture, as the state's ability to transfer resources to the media is limited by transaction costs. Media capture negatively affects political outcomes by increasing corruption and reducing political turnover. The paper also shows that media capture can lead to a reduction in the quality of news, as media outlets may prioritize commercial interests over informative reporting. The model is tested against real-world data, showing that countries with higher levels of media capture tend to have higher levels of corruption. The paper concludes that media independence is crucial for democratic governance and that regulatory policies should aim to promote media pluralism and reduce the risk of government capture.