This paper examines whether hostile takeovers can be distinguished from friendly takeovers based on accounting and stock performance data. The distinction between hostile and friendly takeovers is significant in both popular and academic literature, with hostile takeovers often attributed to the value of replacing incumbent managers, while friendly takeovers are seen to create synergies. However, the paper argues that hostility may simply reflect different patterns of public disclosure, where negotiations are often kept confidential until the public becomes aware of them. Empirical tests show that most deals described as hostile in the press are not distinguishable from friendly deals economically, and that negotiations are publicized earlier in hostile transactions. The study analyzes 2,346 offers for exchange-listed target firms from 1975-1996, using five definitions of hostility and examining pre- and post-bid stock price and accounting performance. The results suggest that the distinction between hostile and friendly offers is largely a reflection of negotiation strategy, with no significant economic differences found between the two types of deals. The paper also explores the impact of hostility on success rates, premiums paid to target shareholders, and the frequency of multiple bidder auctions.This paper examines whether hostile takeovers can be distinguished from friendly takeovers based on accounting and stock performance data. The distinction between hostile and friendly takeovers is significant in both popular and academic literature, with hostile takeovers often attributed to the value of replacing incumbent managers, while friendly takeovers are seen to create synergies. However, the paper argues that hostility may simply reflect different patterns of public disclosure, where negotiations are often kept confidential until the public becomes aware of them. Empirical tests show that most deals described as hostile in the press are not distinguishable from friendly deals economically, and that negotiations are publicized earlier in hostile transactions. The study analyzes 2,346 offers for exchange-listed target firms from 1975-1996, using five definitions of hostility and examining pre- and post-bid stock price and accounting performance. The results suggest that the distinction between hostile and friendly offers is largely a reflection of negotiation strategy, with no significant economic differences found between the two types of deals. The paper also explores the impact of hostility on success rates, premiums paid to target shareholders, and the frequency of multiple bidder auctions.