Family ownership, control, and management significantly affect firm value. Using data from Fortune 500 firms (1994–2000), the study finds that family ownership creates value only when the founder is active as CEO or Chairman with a hired CEO. Dual share classes, pyramids, and voting agreements reduce the founder's premium. When descendants serve as CEOs, firm value is destroyed. The conflict between family and non-family shareholders in descendant-CEO firms is more costly than the owner-manager conflict in non-family firms. Family firms are common in public corporations, but whether they are more or less valuable than non-family firms remains unclear. The study distinguishes three elements of family firms: ownership, control, and management. Family ownership may create or destroy value, depending on the firm's structure. Family control may also create or destroy value, as it can lead to conflicts between large and small shareholders. Family management may reduce agency problems but may also incur costs if hired professionals are better managers. The study finds that family firms with a founder-CEO have higher value than other firms, while family firms with descendant-CEOs have lower value. The results suggest that family firms' value depends on the role of the founder and the presence of control-enhancing mechanisms. The study uses detailed data from proxy filings to examine these effects. The findings are robust to alternative specifications and econometric techniques. The study concludes that family firms' value depends on how ownership, control, and management are defined. The paper is organized into sections on data, main results, and sensitivity analyses. The study finds that family firms have higher Tobin's q than non-family firms, but this may be due to selection bias. The results suggest that family firms with a founder-CEO have higher value than other firms, while family firms with descendant-CEOs have lower value. The study also finds that the value effect of family firms varies across generations. The findings suggest that family ownership, control, and management have complex effects on firm value, and that the value of family firms depends on the specific characteristics of the firm and its management structure.Family ownership, control, and management significantly affect firm value. Using data from Fortune 500 firms (1994–2000), the study finds that family ownership creates value only when the founder is active as CEO or Chairman with a hired CEO. Dual share classes, pyramids, and voting agreements reduce the founder's premium. When descendants serve as CEOs, firm value is destroyed. The conflict between family and non-family shareholders in descendant-CEO firms is more costly than the owner-manager conflict in non-family firms. Family firms are common in public corporations, but whether they are more or less valuable than non-family firms remains unclear. The study distinguishes three elements of family firms: ownership, control, and management. Family ownership may create or destroy value, depending on the firm's structure. Family control may also create or destroy value, as it can lead to conflicts between large and small shareholders. Family management may reduce agency problems but may also incur costs if hired professionals are better managers. The study finds that family firms with a founder-CEO have higher value than other firms, while family firms with descendant-CEOs have lower value. The results suggest that family firms' value depends on the role of the founder and the presence of control-enhancing mechanisms. The study uses detailed data from proxy filings to examine these effects. The findings are robust to alternative specifications and econometric techniques. The study concludes that family firms' value depends on how ownership, control, and management are defined. The paper is organized into sections on data, main results, and sensitivity analyses. The study finds that family firms have higher Tobin's q than non-family firms, but this may be due to selection bias. The results suggest that family firms with a founder-CEO have higher value than other firms, while family firms with descendant-CEOs have lower value. The study also finds that the value effect of family firms varies across generations. The findings suggest that family ownership, control, and management have complex effects on firm value, and that the value of family firms depends on the specific characteristics of the firm and its management structure.