This paper examines how legal origin, creditor rights, property rights, legal formalism, and financial development affect the design of price and non-price terms of bank loans in nearly 60 countries. The authors find that loans made to borrowers in countries where creditors can seize collateral in case of default are more likely to be secured, have longer maturities, and have lower interest rates. They also find evidence of "Coasian" bargaining, where lenders mitigate risks associated with weak legal or institutional arrangements by securing loans with collateral and shortening maturity. The choice of loan ownership structure also affects loan contract terms, with diffuse ownership reducing the risk to lenders and potentially precluding strategic default by borrowers. The results suggest that the contracting environment significantly influences the terms of bank loans, with stronger creditor rights and more efficient courts leading to more secured and longer-term loans.This paper examines how legal origin, creditor rights, property rights, legal formalism, and financial development affect the design of price and non-price terms of bank loans in nearly 60 countries. The authors find that loans made to borrowers in countries where creditors can seize collateral in case of default are more likely to be secured, have longer maturities, and have lower interest rates. They also find evidence of "Coasian" bargaining, where lenders mitigate risks associated with weak legal or institutional arrangements by securing loans with collateral and shortening maturity. The choice of loan ownership structure also affects loan contract terms, with diffuse ownership reducing the risk to lenders and potentially precluding strategic default by borrowers. The results suggest that the contracting environment significantly influences the terms of bank loans, with stronger creditor rights and more efficient courts leading to more secured and longer-term loans.