The illusion of control refers to overestimating one's influence over uncontrollable outcomes. This phenomenon is influenced by personal involvement, where individuals who are more engaged in achieving an outcome tend to believe they have more control. The study explores whether this is due to social motivations or a bias in detecting contingency, particularly when the probability of the action is high. Two experiments were conducted using a yoked design. In Experiment 1, participants were divided into two groups: one actively involved in obtaining an outcome, and the other observing the outcomes. The results showed that those who acted more frequently developed stronger illusions of control, and their yoked counterparts did as well. This suggests that the probability of the action (p(C)) is a key factor in the illusion of control, rather than personal involvement alone. In Experiment 2, the probability of the cause was manipulated, with participants either acting frequently or infrequently. The results confirmed that the illusion of control was stronger when the probability of the cause was higher, regardless of whether the participants were actively involved or observing. This supports the cognitive approach, which posits that the illusion of control is due to biased contingency detection, particularly when the probability of the cause is high. The findings challenge the motivational view that personal involvement is the primary driver of the illusion of control. Instead, they suggest that the probability of the action (p(C)) is the critical factor. This implies that the illusion of control is more about the likelihood of the cause occurring rather than the individual's personal involvement or self-esteem. The study highlights the importance of considering p(C) in understanding the illusion of control, as it significantly influences contingency judgments.The illusion of control refers to overestimating one's influence over uncontrollable outcomes. This phenomenon is influenced by personal involvement, where individuals who are more engaged in achieving an outcome tend to believe they have more control. The study explores whether this is due to social motivations or a bias in detecting contingency, particularly when the probability of the action is high. Two experiments were conducted using a yoked design. In Experiment 1, participants were divided into two groups: one actively involved in obtaining an outcome, and the other observing the outcomes. The results showed that those who acted more frequently developed stronger illusions of control, and their yoked counterparts did as well. This suggests that the probability of the action (p(C)) is a key factor in the illusion of control, rather than personal involvement alone. In Experiment 2, the probability of the cause was manipulated, with participants either acting frequently or infrequently. The results confirmed that the illusion of control was stronger when the probability of the cause was higher, regardless of whether the participants were actively involved or observing. This supports the cognitive approach, which posits that the illusion of control is due to biased contingency detection, particularly when the probability of the cause is high. The findings challenge the motivational view that personal involvement is the primary driver of the illusion of control. Instead, they suggest that the probability of the action (p(C)) is the critical factor. This implies that the illusion of control is more about the likelihood of the cause occurring rather than the individual's personal involvement or self-esteem. The study highlights the importance of considering p(C) in understanding the illusion of control, as it significantly influences contingency judgments.