The paper by Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole explores the dynamics of prosocial behavior, combining individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. The authors argue that rewards or punishments can create doubt about the true motives behind good deeds, leading to a "overjustification effect" where extrinsic incentives can crowd out intrinsic motivation. They identify settings conducive to multiple social norms and the potential for disclosure of generosity to backfire. The study also examines how sponsors choose incentive levels, the confidentiality and publicity of agents' behavior, and the welfare implications of sponsor competition. The paper provides a unified framework to explain various phenomena, including the crowding out of intrinsic motivation by extrinsic incentives, the role of social signaling, and the impact of reputational concerns on individual decisions.The paper by Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole explores the dynamics of prosocial behavior, combining individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. The authors argue that rewards or punishments can create doubt about the true motives behind good deeds, leading to a "overjustification effect" where extrinsic incentives can crowd out intrinsic motivation. They identify settings conducive to multiple social norms and the potential for disclosure of generosity to backfire. The study also examines how sponsors choose incentive levels, the confidentiality and publicity of agents' behavior, and the welfare implications of sponsor competition. The paper provides a unified framework to explain various phenomena, including the crowding out of intrinsic motivation by extrinsic incentives, the role of social signaling, and the impact of reputational concerns on individual decisions.