The Condorcet Jury Theorem states that majorities are more likely than any single individual to select the "better" of two alternatives when there is uncertainty about which alternative is preferred. The theorem assumes that individuals vote sincerely, meaning they choose the alternative they believe is better based on their private information. However, the authors argue that sincere voting is not always rational, as it may not constitute a Nash equilibrium. They show that when all individuals vote sincerely, their behavior may not be optimal given the information they possess. This challenges the assumption that sincere voting is rational and highlights the importance of considering rational decision-making in collective decision-making processes. The authors also discuss the implications of this finding for the Condorcet Jury Theorem, showing that the theorem's assumptions may not hold in all cases. They conclude that while the theorem provides a useful framework for understanding majority decision-making, it requires careful consideration of the assumptions underlying it.The Condorcet Jury Theorem states that majorities are more likely than any single individual to select the "better" of two alternatives when there is uncertainty about which alternative is preferred. The theorem assumes that individuals vote sincerely, meaning they choose the alternative they believe is better based on their private information. However, the authors argue that sincere voting is not always rational, as it may not constitute a Nash equilibrium. They show that when all individuals vote sincerely, their behavior may not be optimal given the information they possess. This challenges the assumption that sincere voting is rational and highlights the importance of considering rational decision-making in collective decision-making processes. The authors also discuss the implications of this finding for the Condorcet Jury Theorem, showing that the theorem's assumptions may not hold in all cases. They conclude that while the theorem provides a useful framework for understanding majority decision-making, it requires careful consideration of the assumptions underlying it.