The article by David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey S. Banks explores the Condorcet Jury Theorem, which states that majorities are more likely to select the "better" alternative than any single individual when there is uncertainty about which alternative is truly better. The authors challenge the implicit assumption in most proofs of the theorem that individuals vote "sincerely," meaning they vote based on their private information. They argue that sincere voting is not always rational, even when individuals have a common preference for the better alternative. The key finding is that sincere voting does not constitute a Nash equilibrium, meaning it is not a stable strategy where no individual can improve their outcome by changing their vote. The authors provide examples and formal analysis to support their claims, demonstrating that sincere voting can lead to irrational behavior in certain scenarios. They conclude that a satisfactory rational choice foundation for the Condorcet Jury Theorem has yet to be derived.The article by David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey S. Banks explores the Condorcet Jury Theorem, which states that majorities are more likely to select the "better" alternative than any single individual when there is uncertainty about which alternative is truly better. The authors challenge the implicit assumption in most proofs of the theorem that individuals vote "sincerely," meaning they vote based on their private information. They argue that sincere voting is not always rational, even when individuals have a common preference for the better alternative. The key finding is that sincere voting does not constitute a Nash equilibrium, meaning it is not a stable strategy where no individual can improve their outcome by changing their vote. The authors provide examples and formal analysis to support their claims, demonstrating that sincere voting can lead to irrational behavior in certain scenarios. They conclude that a satisfactory rational choice foundation for the Condorcet Jury Theorem has yet to be derived.