This chapter, titled "Information in the Labor Market," by George J. Stigler, explores the role of information in wage determination and labor market dynamics. Stigler argues that the number of potential employers for a young worker is vast, and it is impossible for them to be fully informed about all these employers' wage rates and conditions. The dispersion of wage rates is a key issue, and even in well-organized markets like those for college graduates, the dispersion is significant, typically around 5-10%. Stigler discusses the conditions under which workers will search for job opportunities until the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost. He finds that the dispersion of wage rates is influenced by the frequency of job changes, the correlation between successive wage offers, and the duration of employment. The longer the expected period of employment, the greater the incentive to search, but this also reduces the realized dispersion. The chapter also examines the costs of search, which vary with the characteristics of occupations and the level of earnings. Smaller companies generally have lower search costs because they can directly observe worker performance and judge quality more accurately. The capital value of information is calculated, showing that it can be substantial, with private capital in laborers' information estimated at around $100 billion. Finally, Stigler emphasizes the social benefits of efficient labor market allocation, where better-informed workers and employers lead to more productive and equitable outcomes. The analysis highlights the importance of understanding and managing information in labor markets.This chapter, titled "Information in the Labor Market," by George J. Stigler, explores the role of information in wage determination and labor market dynamics. Stigler argues that the number of potential employers for a young worker is vast, and it is impossible for them to be fully informed about all these employers' wage rates and conditions. The dispersion of wage rates is a key issue, and even in well-organized markets like those for college graduates, the dispersion is significant, typically around 5-10%. Stigler discusses the conditions under which workers will search for job opportunities until the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost. He finds that the dispersion of wage rates is influenced by the frequency of job changes, the correlation between successive wage offers, and the duration of employment. The longer the expected period of employment, the greater the incentive to search, but this also reduces the realized dispersion. The chapter also examines the costs of search, which vary with the characteristics of occupations and the level of earnings. Smaller companies generally have lower search costs because they can directly observe worker performance and judge quality more accurately. The capital value of information is calculated, showing that it can be substantial, with private capital in laborers' information estimated at around $100 billion. Finally, Stigler emphasizes the social benefits of efficient labor market allocation, where better-informed workers and employers lead to more productive and equitable outcomes. The analysis highlights the importance of understanding and managing information in labor markets.