The paper "Input-to-State Stabilizing Control Under Denial-of-Service" by De Persis and Tesi addresses the issue of cyber-security in networked control systems, specifically focusing on denial-of-service (DoS) attacks that prevent transmissions over the network. The authors characterize the frequency and duration of DoS attacks under which input-to-state stability (ISS) of the closed-loop system can be preserved. They determine a suitable scheduling of transmission times to achieve ISS and show that the framework allows for flexible implementation options that trade off performance against communication resources. The paper includes examples to substantiate the analysis and discusses various sampling strategies, such as periodic, event-based, and self-triggering, each with its advantages and trade-offs. The main results are derived using Lyapunov arguments and stability theory for switched systems, providing conditions for ISS under DoS attacks.The paper "Input-to-State Stabilizing Control Under Denial-of-Service" by De Persis and Tesi addresses the issue of cyber-security in networked control systems, specifically focusing on denial-of-service (DoS) attacks that prevent transmissions over the network. The authors characterize the frequency and duration of DoS attacks under which input-to-state stability (ISS) of the closed-loop system can be preserved. They determine a suitable scheduling of transmission times to achieve ISS and show that the framework allows for flexible implementation options that trade off performance against communication resources. The paper includes examples to substantiate the analysis and discusses various sampling strategies, such as periodic, event-based, and self-triggering, each with its advantages and trade-offs. The main results are derived using Lyapunov arguments and stability theory for switched systems, providing conditions for ISS under DoS attacks.