This special issue of the International Game Theory Review (IGTR) is dedicated to the 13th European Meeting on Game Theory (SING13), held in Paris, France, in July 2017. The conference, chaired by Stefano Moretti, featured a record number of submissions and included 178 scheduled talks and 5 plenary lectures. The issue includes 11 out of 15 high-quality papers selected from the conference, covering topics in cooperative and non-cooperative games. In the first volume, papers focus on cooperative games and voting, including characterizations of power indices, axiomatic approaches to ranking competitors, and solutions for repeated and multistage games. In the second volume, papers address non-cooperative games and equilibria, such as advertising models, optimal contracts, Cournot oligopolies, auctions, and commitment measures in dynamic games. The guest editors express gratitude to the authors and reviewers for their contributions.This special issue of the International Game Theory Review (IGTR) is dedicated to the 13th European Meeting on Game Theory (SING13), held in Paris, France, in July 2017. The conference, chaired by Stefano Moretti, featured a record number of submissions and included 178 scheduled talks and 5 plenary lectures. The issue includes 11 out of 15 high-quality papers selected from the conference, covering topics in cooperative and non-cooperative games. In the first volume, papers focus on cooperative games and voting, including characterizations of power indices, axiomatic approaches to ranking competitors, and solutions for repeated and multistage games. In the second volume, papers address non-cooperative games and equilibria, such as advertising models, optimal contracts, Cournot oligopolies, auctions, and commitment measures in dynamic games. The guest editors express gratitude to the authors and reviewers for their contributions.