The article explores the EU's ability to avoid a 'politics trap' during the second polycrisis, following the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It defines a polycrisis as a simultaneous occurrence of crises with interconnected consequences, which can create 'polycleavages'—cross-cutting divisions that polarize member states and citizens. These divisions can hinder the EU's ability to reach compromises on key issues, leading to a 'politics trap' where negative politicization of European issues inhibits national leaders from agreeing on solutions, while the resulting deadlock undermines the Union's legitimacy and fuels Euroscepticism. The article argues that the EU has shown resilience in navigating the second polycrisis, with responses to the pandemic and the Ukraine invasion suggesting that other outcomes are possible. It highlights the role of strategic responses by political leaders in avoiding the politics trap, including the framing of crises as collective problems requiring collective action. The EU's ability to reach consensus on shared problem frames and common action frames, such as joint vaccine purchases, collective borrowing, and sanctions against Russia, has helped mitigate the impact of the crises. The article also discusses the role of public opinion and the public sphere in shaping the EU's response. It notes that the second polycrisis did not trigger a politics trap due to the convergence of public debates across member states, which aligned domestic media discussions and enabled coordinated responses. The crisis also fostered a sense of shared identity and solidarity, which reinforced the EU's legitimacy and capacity for collective action. The article concludes that the EU's responses to the second polycrisis demonstrate a progressive learning process, building on the positive lessons of the Union's successful response to Brexit and the negative lessons of the first polycrisis. This has reinforced EU norms of unity, solidarity, and collective responsibility, helping the Union to avoid a politics trap. The temporal succession of EU polycrises is seen as a sequential process, where successful responses to one crisis enhance the Union's capacity and commitment to resolve the next. Avoiding a politics trap in one crisis thus increases the likelihood of avoiding it in the next, transforming the cross-sectoral spillovers of a polycrisis from a negative to a positive force for further integration.The article explores the EU's ability to avoid a 'politics trap' during the second polycrisis, following the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It defines a polycrisis as a simultaneous occurrence of crises with interconnected consequences, which can create 'polycleavages'—cross-cutting divisions that polarize member states and citizens. These divisions can hinder the EU's ability to reach compromises on key issues, leading to a 'politics trap' where negative politicization of European issues inhibits national leaders from agreeing on solutions, while the resulting deadlock undermines the Union's legitimacy and fuels Euroscepticism. The article argues that the EU has shown resilience in navigating the second polycrisis, with responses to the pandemic and the Ukraine invasion suggesting that other outcomes are possible. It highlights the role of strategic responses by political leaders in avoiding the politics trap, including the framing of crises as collective problems requiring collective action. The EU's ability to reach consensus on shared problem frames and common action frames, such as joint vaccine purchases, collective borrowing, and sanctions against Russia, has helped mitigate the impact of the crises. The article also discusses the role of public opinion and the public sphere in shaping the EU's response. It notes that the second polycrisis did not trigger a politics trap due to the convergence of public debates across member states, which aligned domestic media discussions and enabled coordinated responses. The crisis also fostered a sense of shared identity and solidarity, which reinforced the EU's legitimacy and capacity for collective action. The article concludes that the EU's responses to the second polycrisis demonstrate a progressive learning process, building on the positive lessons of the Union's successful response to Brexit and the negative lessons of the first polycrisis. This has reinforced EU norms of unity, solidarity, and collective responsibility, helping the Union to avoid a politics trap. The temporal succession of EU polycrises is seen as a sequential process, where successful responses to one crisis enhance the Union's capacity and commitment to resolve the next. Avoiding a politics trap in one crisis thus increases the likelihood of avoiding it in the next, transforming the cross-sectoral spillovers of a polycrisis from a negative to a positive force for further integration.